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ARBITRATION AS CONTRACT: THE NEED FOR A
FULLY DEVELOPED AND COMPREHENSIVE SET OF
STATUTORY DEFAULT LEGAL RULES
JACK M. GRAVES*
ABSTRACT
This Article analyzes the United States Federal Arbitration Act, as a
statutory framework for effective arbitration of contract disputes. While
arbitration under this Act has been subject to ever increasing criticism and
calls for reform on a variety of fronts—most often from the perspective of
consumer or employment arbitration—this Article focuses specifically on
commercial, business-to-business arbitration and critically evaluates the Act
as a set of default legal rules governing arbitration as a unique contractual
business relationship.
The Article first looks at arbitration from a contractual default rules
perspective and then employs this perspective to analyze: (1) the existing
federal statutory scheme; (2) the developing body of federal “common law”
governing arbitration; (3) the potential impact of state legislation governing
arbitration; and (4) the use of private rules to govern arbitration. Finally, the
Article looks at the related doctrines of “competence-competence” and
separability under U.S. law, specifically focusing on the Supreme Court’s
recent decision in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson. The Article ultimately concludes with a call for an entirely new federal statute governing
both domestic and international commercial business-to-business arbitration.
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INTRODUCTION
The basic idea of arbitration is deceptively simple. Two or more persons
choose to resolve their disputes privately, thereby foregoing traditional court
adjudication. Upon closer examination, of course, we discover that this
simple theoretical construct often raises a variety of challenging and complex
issues in its practical application.1 In some cases, these issues may be
resolved by reference to the parties’ arbitration agreement, which may
include a designated arbitral institution or a set of specified rules for conducting the arbitration. In many other cases, however, the parties must look
for answers within the applicable legal framework governing their arbitration
agreement.
In the United States, arbitration is largely governed by the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA).2 The FAA governs both domestic3 and international4
arbitration, though it may, under certain circumstances, give way to or be
supplemented by state laws governing arbitration.5 In the case of international commercial arbitration, the FAA also incorporates either the
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
(New York Convention)6 or the Inter-American Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration (Panama Convention).7 This broad legal framework—as a default source of the parties’ rights and obligations under
domestic and international agreements to arbitrate commercial, business-tobusiness disputes—serves as the focus of the Article.

1

For example, who decides if the parties agreed to arbitrate their dispute; how many
arbitrators are required; what happens if one of the parties refuses to cooperate; how much
discovery is allowed; what sort of hearing procedures are appropriate; and to what extent the
arbitrator’s award is subject to any sort of judicial review?
2
9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2006).
3
Id. §§ 1-16 (2006).
4
Id. §§ 201-307 (2006).
5
The requirements for choosing state arbitration law are not entirely clear. See generally
George A. Bermann, Ascertaining the Parties’ Intentions in Arbitral Design, 113 PENN ST.
L. REV. 1013 (2009) (discussing the application of “generic” choice of law clauses, the scope
of a state’s arbitration laws, and the interplay between federal and state arbitration law). The
extent to which the FAA preempts state law remains open to significant unresolved
questions. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J.
393, 407-09 (2004) [hereinafter Drahozal, FAA Preemeption]. Each of these issues is
explored more fully. See infra Part II.C.
6
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention].
7
Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 30, 1975, 14
I.L.M. 336 [hereinafter Panama Convention].
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As a prelude to an examination of the legal framework governing
arbitration, it is worth considering briefly the nature of arbitration from a few
distinctive possible viewpoints. Arbitration, like the proverbial “Elephant”
examined by the “Blind Men,”8 is many different things to different people—
depending on one’s perspective or the lens through which it is examined.
For example, many critics focus on arbitration as a waiver of fundamental
rights, often accomplished with largely unread form contracts.9 One might
reasonably ask whether arbitration should be highly regulated by mandatory
rules, lest stronger parties take undue advantage of weaker parties. In fact,
one might further ask whether ex-ante agreements between such parties
should be enforced at all.10
Another lens through which one might view arbitration is that of a
binding dispute resolution “procedure.” From this perspective, arbitration is
simply a variation on existing court procedures available for the binding
resolution of private disputes—one with private judges, perhaps fewer
formalities, and less post-decisional review, but nonetheless a binding dispute
resolution procedure that in many ways resembles court adjudication.
From a slightly different perspective, one might view arbitration, not by
way of comparison to any sort of public adjudication, but instead, as one of
many alternatives to such binding adjudication commonly described as
alternative dispute resolution or ADR. From this perspective one might, for
8

See JOHN GODFREY SAXE, The Blind Men and the Elephant, in THE POEMS OF JOHN
GODFREY SAXE 135 (J.R. Osgood ed., 1873). The parable of the blind men and the elephant
has also been attributed to the Buddha. See also JOSEPH MORRISSEY & JACK GRAVES,
INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW AND ARBITRATION, 299-300 (2008) (employing this analogy to
introduce the law and practice of arbitration). Professor Park has used this same analogy in
reference to arbitration, albeit for the purpose of drawing somewhat different distinctions.
See William W. Park, The Specificity of International Arbitration: The Case for FAA
Reform, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L 1241, 1242 n.1 (2003) [hereinafter Park, The Specificity of
International Arbitration]; WILLIAM W. PARK, ARBITRATION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
DISPUTES 222 n.1 (2006). In each case, Professor Park points out a broad variety of legal
disputes that might be resolved through arbitration.
9
See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims: An
Economic Analysis, 8 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 209, 211-12 & nn.2-4 (2000).
10
Several scholars have touched on this question. See generally Richard A Bales & Sue
Irion, How Congress Can Make a More Equitable Federal Arbitration Act, 113 PENN ST. L.
REV. 1081 (2009) (noting that scholars “have not shared the Supreme Court’s endorsement
of compulsory arbitration”); JEAN R. STERNLIGHT, Consumer Arbitration, in ARBITRATION
LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 127 (2006); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and
Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between
Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449 (1996).
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example, consider the differences between binding arbitration and voluntary
mediation, conciliation, or other forms of ass isted settlement.
From an international or transnational perspective, arbitration takes on
additional benefits and challenges. Parties from different legal cultures, as
well as private and state entities, often particularly prefer the sort of neutral
forum provided by arbitration, and arbitral awards are generally easier to
enforce across national borders.11 However, various national laws governing
arbitration may differ in ways that affect the nature of the arbitral process.
Lastly, one might view arbitration as a matter of contract—examining arbitration agreements as fully independent and separable consensual agreements, even when contained within broader agreements for goods, services,
or other contractual rights and obligations.
Each of these perspectives is of course instructive, and a full understanding of arbitration requires some level of understanding of all of them
(just as a full understanding of the proverbial elephant requires an
understanding of all of its parts). This Article will focus on arbitration as
contract—not because this perspective is any more important than any other,
generally, but because it provides particularly useful insights in evaluating
the current state of United States law governing commercial arbitration and
potential proposals for its improvement. Specifically, this Article will focus
on commercial, business-to-business arbitration and examine the
effectiveness of the existing American legal framework governing arbitration
agreements as a unique form of contract.
While others have explored the contractual nature of commercial
arbitration, such explorations typically focus on the broad autonomy granted
to parties in structuring the private dispute resolution mechanism.12 Somewhat less has been written about the law governing commercial arbitration as
a set of contractual default rules,13 and even less has been written on the need
11

William W. Park, National Law and Commercial Justice: Safeguarding Procedural
Integrity in International Arbitration, 63 TUL. L. REV. 647, 656-57 (1989).
12
See generally Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract Model
of Arbitration, 74 TUL. L. REV. 39 (1999) (noting that parties add “customized features” to
arbitration agreements); Thomas Carbonneau, The Exercise of Contract Freedom in the
Making of Arbitration Agreements, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1189 (2003) (explaining
that freedom of contract is embodied in arbitration agreements); Thomas Stipanowich,
Arbitration and Choice: Taking Charge of the “New Litigation,” 7 DEPAUL BUS. & COM.
L.J. 383 (2009) (noting the need for “real choice” in arbitration agreements).
13
Much of the literature instead focuses on the tension between broad party autonomy
and various proposals of mandatory rules for the protection of consumers and employees in
arbitration, and the literature addressing default rules has tended to work around the edges of
current federal law, as reflected in the Federal Arbitration Act. See generally EDWARD
BRUNET ET AL., ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT (2006) (noting
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for a singular, comprehensive and systematic treatment of both domestic and
international commercial arbitration.14
Originally enacted in 1925, the “venerable” FAA has been subject to
increasingly frequent critiques and calls for amendment. As suggested above,
many of these critiques argue for greater protection of perceived “weaker”
parties, such as consumers and employees, and propose either stronger
mandatory legal rules protecting such parties or the complete exclusion of
these parties from the effects of ex-ante arbitration agreements.15 The FAA
the need for a reformulation of federal arbitration law).
14
See, e.g., Jack J. Coe, The Case for the UNCITRAL Model—An Introduction, 4 INT’L
ARB. NEWS 2, 2-4 (2004); Daniel M. Kolkey, Reflections on the U.S. Statutory Framework
for International Commercial Arbitrations: Its Scope, Its Shortcomings, and the Advantages
of U.S. Adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law, 1 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 491, 534 (1990)
(calling for revision or replacement of the FAA, but limiting focus to international
commercial arbitration); see also James M. Gaitis, The Federal Arbitration Act: Risks and
Incongruities Relating to the Issuance of Interim and Partial Awards in Domestic and
International Arbitrations, 16 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 3-5 (2005) (calling for replacement of
the FAA, but focusing specifically on interim and partial awards).
15
See, e.g., Margaret Moses, Arbitration Law: Who’s in Charge? 40 SETON HALL L.
REV. 147, 189 (2010); Margaret Moses, Privatized “Justice,” 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 535, 548
(2005). Under most national legal systems, pre-dispute arbitration agreements involving
consumers, employees, and other highly regulated contractual relationships are invalid and
unenforceable. See Margaret Moses, Privatized “Justice”, supra; Christopher R. Drahozal,
New Experiences of International Commercial Arbitration in the United States, 54 AM. J.
COMP. L. SUPP. 233, 253 (2006) [hereinafter Drahozal, New Experiences of International
Commercial Arbitration]. There is currently legislation before both houses of Congress that
would achieve a similar result under United States law—rendering pre-dispute arbitration
agreements invalid and unenforceable with respect to employees, consumers, franchisees,
civil rights claimants, and other parties whose transactions are statutorily regulated based on
unequal bargaining power. S. 931, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009). The
prospects for passage of the foregoing are uncertain at this time. Congress has, however,
recently passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010), which provides for regulatory oversight and potential
restriction of arbitration of financial disputes involving consumers. See Karen Halverson
Cross, Letting the Arbitrator Decide Unconscionability Challenges, 26 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1552966. In one respect,
the elimination of ex ante arbitration agreements involving consumers, employees, and other
protected parties—which raise a whole host of unique issues—might very well make it much
easier to address the inadequacy of the FAA, as related to commercial, business-to-business
arbitration. It is often observed that one of the most significant challenges in amending the
FAA is the fear of opening the proverbial “Pandora’s box” of special interests, particularly
those involving consumer and employment arbitration. Park, The Specificity of International
Arbitration, supra note 8, at 1295; see also Drahozal, FAA Preemption, supra note 5, at 235.
With these concerns removed, it may be easier to address more basic business concerns
regarding the existing legal structure. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The New
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has also been subject to critiques and calls for amendment to correct a variety
of other deficiencies.16 The problems presented by the FAA are perceived by
many to be particularly acute in the context of international transactions,
leading to calls for a variety of potential solutions, including amendment,17 a
new “restatement” of existing common law,18 and even a completely new
statute specifically governing international commercial arbitration.19 However, there have been very few, if any, thorough examinations of the potential
value of a comprehensive new statute governing both domestic and
international commercial arbitration.20 This Article attempts to fill that void.
The objective of this Article is to explore more fully the idea of commercial,
business-to-business arbitration,21 not simply as a contract subject to autonomous ordering, limited by any appropriate mandatory legal rules, but as a
sufficiently unique and important genus of contract to justify a specific,
Litigation, 2010 ILL. L. REV. 1, 57 (2010) (explaining that an understanding of key
contextual differences between business-to-business transactions, as compared to consumer
and employee transactions, is essential to lawmakers); Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arguments in
Favor of the Triumph of Arbitration, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 395, 417-18 (2009)
(noting the “maul[ing]” of U.S. domestic arbitration by the “claws of politicalization”).
However, depending on the final structure of any amendment addressing consumer or
employment arbitration, important elements of business-to-business, commercial arbitration
might be adversely affected. See generally Thomas E. Carbonneau, “Arbitracide”: The Story
of Anti-Arbitration Sentiment in the U.S. Congress, 18 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 233 (2007);
Edna Sussman, The Arbitration Fairness Act: Unintended Consequences Threaten U.S.
Business, 18 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 455 (2007) (addressing similar legislation to the current
legislation cited above). The comprehensive approach to new legislation ultimately
suggested by this article would, however, avoid such unintended spillover from any efforts to
amend the current statute.
16
See Edward Brunet, The Appropriate Role of State Law in the Federal Arbitration
System: Choice and Preemption, in ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 63-87 (2006).
17
See Park, The Specificity of International Arbitration, supra note 8, at 1242-43.
18
George A. Bermann, et al., Restating the U.S. Law of International Commercial
Arbitration, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1333 (2009) (outlining the purpose, scope, and drafting
process of the Third Restatement on International Commercial Arbitration).
19
See Coe, supra note 14, at 2-4.
20
For two excellent examples of recent national legislation governing both domestic and
international commercial arbitration, one might consider the United Kingdom’s Arbitration
Act, 1996, c. 23 (Eng.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/ 1996/23/contents
(demonstrating a statute with a common law heritage), or Germany’s Arbitration Act,
Schiedsverfahrensrecht [Arbitration Act], Jan. 1, 1998 (Ger.), available at http://www.disarb.de/materialien (showing a statute with a civil law heritage).
21
This Article will address both domestic and international commercial arbitration, but
will exclude arbitration of consumer and employment agreements, each of which present
various issues that differ significantly from those faced in commercial, business-to-business
arbitration.
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comprehensive, and systematic legal regime, complete with a fully developed
set of default legal provisions.
This Article begins, in Part I, by examining the specific potential for
incomplete commercial agreements to arbitrate disputes and the application
of various theories of default rules to these incomplete agreements. Under the
vast majority of legal regimes governing arbitration, including the FAA, a
simple agreement to final and binding arbitration of commercial disputes is
fully enforceable—even if the agreement says little, if anything, else about
the process of dispute resolution.22 Thus, an agreement to arbitrate presents a
number of classic issues in providing for default rules, as well as some particularized issues based on the nature of an arbitration agreement. These
issues are further analyzed in terms of the theory of nominate contracts and
analogized to the manner in which American law treats agreements for the
sale of goods23 and partnership agreements24—albeit by reference to uniform
state law rather than a federal statute.25 In considering these issues, the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (UNCITRAL
Model Law)26 provides a useful point of comparative reference, as a
comprehensive statutory scheme providing a broad array of default rules
governing arbitration.
Part II addresses potential sources of gap filling for incomplete contracts,
beginning with an analysis of existing law under the FAA—a statute almost
22

An arbitration agreement “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity of the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
23
See generally U.C.C. art. 2 (superseded 2003).
24
See generally UNIF. P’SHIP ACT (1997).
25
This distinction is more fully discussed infra, Part II.
26
Model Law on Int’l Commercial Arbitration of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law,
U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/40/17, annex I, at 81-93 (June 21, 1985)
[hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law]. This model law has been adopted, in substance, by
over fifty countries and six U.S. states. See Status: 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on Int’l
Commercial Arbitration, UNCITRAL: U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, http://
www.uncitral.org/uncitral/encitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_status.html (last
visited Mar.27, 2011) [hereinafter Status: 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law]. For a discussion
of the effect of U.S. state adoptions see infra Part II.C.3 on the law governing international
commercial arbitration. At least one country, Germany, has also adopted the UNCITRAL
Model Law to govern domestic arbitration as well. Dr. Stefan Kröll, Germany, in III
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1, 1 (Albert Jan van den Berg
ed., 2007). The UNCITRAL Model Law was amended in 2006 to modernize the writing
requirement (art. 7) and add a far more comprehensive set of provisions governing interim
measures. See Model Law on Int’l Commercial Arbitration of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l
Trade Law, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/61/17, annex I at 56-60 (as
revised on July 7, 2006) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law—2006 Amendment].
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entirely devoid of default legal rules regarding the conduct of arbitration
proceedings.27 In evaluating the effectiveness of the FAA as a set of default
legal rules, Part II.A also looks at a variety of challenges under the existing
multi-part statutory structure, while Part II.B addresses the broader question
of whether gaps in agreements to arbitrate are more effectively filled by
courts under a common law approach or by the legislature under a comprehensive statutory approach.
Part II.C then examines the question of whether gaps—if statutorily
filled—are best addressed by state or federal law. While most state laws
historically provided little more than the FAA in the way of default rules, the
Revised Uniform Arbitration Act of 2000 (RUAA)28 expressly attempts to fill
this void with respect to domestic arbitration.29 However, it is debatable
whether RUAA goes far enough in providing a comprehensive statute, and its
effectiveness is significantly limited by the potentially broad and, to some
degree, uncertain pre-emptive effect of the FAA on various matters addressed
by RUAA.30 A number of United States states have attempted to fill the void
left by the FAA with respect to international commercial arbitration by
adopting at least substantial portions of the UNCITRAL Model Law.31
However, these adoptions have not been particularly uniform,32 and
significant unresolved issues of preemption call into question the
effectiveness of such adoptions.33
Part II.D addresses the availability of various institutional and ad hoc
arbitration rules and the potential that such rules might obviate the need for
any default legal rules. In comparing the relative value and effectiveness of
default legal rules versus the parties’ own agreement, including privately
chosen rules, Part II.D addresses the specific challenges of the unique
contractual version of competence-competence (the jurisdiction of an arbitral
tribunal to decide its own jurisdiction) developed by the United States
Supreme Court in its interpretation of the FAA.
In conclusion, this Article calls for a new and comprehensive federal
statutory scheme governing domestic and international commercial arbitration—and fully replacing the existing Federal Arbitration Act. Such a
27

Drahozal, New Experiences of International Commercial Arbitration, supra note 15, at
236, 238.
28
UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT (2000) [hereinafter RUAA].
29
Id. at Prefatory Note.
30
See Drahozal, FAA Preemption, supra note 5, at 420 tbl.1.
31
See Jack J. Coe Jr., The Serviceable Texts of International Commercial Arbitration: An
Embarrassment of Riches, 10 WILLIAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RES. 143, 148 (2002).
32
Gerold Herrmann, UNCITRAL’s Work Towards a Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration, 4 PACE L. REV. 537, 538 (1984).
33
See Drahozal, FAA Preemption, supra note 5, at 407-25.
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scheme could eliminate the need for state law or any “restatement” of the
existing common law governing arbitration in this country and would fully
complement the use of private rules of arbitration, to the extent the latter
might be incorporated by the parties into their arbitration agreement.
I. INCOMPLETE COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS TO ARBITRATE: THE NEED
FOR DEFAULT RULES
Parties may conclude a binding agreement to arbitrate their disputes by
simply saying so in writing.34 They need not say anything more about the
specific nature of their intent. As long as they agree to final and binding
arbitration of a defined range of disputes and the dispute in question falls
within the scope of this range, each of the parties is fully bound to comply.35
In agreeing to arbitration, the parties will have effectively displaced a
detailed and fully developed set of procedures for adjudication of their
dispute by a court. In the case of a simple, bare-bones agreement to arbitrate,
however, the parties will have provided nothing to replace these court
procedures. While a simplified dispute resolution procedure is admittedly one
of the major reasons parties choose arbitration, few would likely say they
chose arbitration for the lack of any procedure at all. Thus, we have a very
real potential for binding arbitration agreements that lack a significant degree
of completeness.
A. Reasons for Incomplete Arbitration Agreements
All contracts are, to at least some degree, incomplete.36 The reasons for
this lack of completeness vary, but might generally be divided into two broad
categories: (1) lack of ex ante awareness of all of the factual or legal issues
34

In fact, an agreement need not even necessarily be in writing under the current version
of the UNCITRAL Model Law. See UNCITRAL Model Law—2006 Amendment, supra
note 26, art. 7. See also Jack Graves, ICA and the Writing Requirement: Following Modern
Trends Towards Liberalization or Are We Stuck in 1958?, 3 BELGRADE L. REV. 36 (2009)
(discussing the liberalization of form requirements for arbitration agreements). However, the
extent to which national legislatures will follow this trend towards liberalizing form
requirements governing arbitration agreements is yet to be determined. Id. at 39.
35
Of course, the parties can always mutually agree to modify or terminate their
agreement, as in the case of any contract. However, an agreement on the resolution of
disputes is often particularly difficult to modify at the time of its performance because parties
in need of binding dispute resolution will often have a difficult time agreeing on anything.
36
Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78
VA. L. REV. 821, 821 (1992).
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that might ultimately arise between the parties; and (2) lack of willingness or
ability to expend the time, energy, goodwill, or financial capital to resolve the
issue at the time of contract formation.37 The reasons for the latter source of
incompleteness are particularly acute in the context of arbitration agreements.
In some circumstances, “the very act of negotiating for a specific contract
term may signal negative information to the other party.”38 While the basic
suggestion of resolving any disputes through arbitration might generally be
viewed in a positive light,39 attempts to provide further details with respect to
such arbitration might very well suggest that the party suggesting these
details believes an arbitrated dispute to be a likely outcome of the parties’
relationship.40 Or, even worse, any detailed negotiation of an arbitration
agreement might be seen as an attempt to gain a tactical advantage in the
event of such an outcome.41 Thus, an arbitration agreement is even more
likely to be incomplete as a result of the perceived costs of completing the
agreement more fully.
Many parties, as well as many of their transactional counsel, will also
often lack a thorough understanding of the myriad of issues that may—and
all too often do—arise during the process of resolving a dispute through
arbitration.42 When considering the options for binding dispute resolution, the
parties essentially have two choices: (1) litigation; or (2) arbitration. While
there are a host of positive, well documented reasons why parties affirm37

Id. at 822; see also Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 94 (1989) (defining, more narrowly,
the former category based on one party’s strategic behavior in consciously withholding
information from its contracting partner). In the analysis that follows, this Article will treat
this alternative source of incompleteness discussed by Ayres and Gertner as a subset of the
broader category of cases in which the parties’ knowledge is incomplete, for whatever
reason.
38
Stephen J. Choi, The Problem with Arbitration Agreements, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 1233, 1236 (2003).
39
At a very basic level, a general suggestion at the time of contracting that the parties
agree to stay out of court would often be seen as quite positive in terms of the future
relationship.
40
Choi, supra note 38, at 1236. In addition, even sophisticated parties will often enter
into a contractual relationship with an overly optimistic belief in their ability to avoid
disputes, thereby reducing the potential value of “completing” the dispute resolution term.
Id.
41
In fact, at least one author suggests negotiating arbitration agreements in hopes of
achieving just such a tactical advantage. Stipanowich, supra note 12, at 388-89. However,
this same author agrees that, as a practical matter, this is often quite difficult, because parties
intent on making a deal are reluctant to dwell on the subject of possible conflict resolution.
Id. at 390.
42
Id. at 389.
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atively choose arbitration,43 many also choose it simply because of what it is
not—in effect, choosing arbitration simply because it is not litigation.44 As a
general alternative to litigation—albeit one that many parties do not fully
understand—an agreement to arbitrate will often be incomplete based on the
parties’ lack of knowledge regarding many of the nuanced details of
arbitration.
When we consider both the lack of knowledge with respect to many
parties and their transactional counsel, as well as the significant potential
costs of negotiating terms in specific contemplation of an eventual contract
dispute, it is easy to see why many arbitration agreements are incomplete.
This of course leads to the question of how, if at all, such agreements should
be completed.
B. Should the Law Fill Gaps in Any Manner When an Arbitration Agreement
is Incomplete?
The initial question is whether gaps in an incomplete arbitration agreement should be filled at all. The act of filling gaps in the parties’ agreement is
ultimately a double-edged sword. On one hand, completing those items the
parties left out due to ignorance or the high cost of completion would
seemingly serve the parties’ interests in giving full effect to their intentions.45
On the other hand, completing the parties’ agreement also risks the
43

See Christopher Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not Use)
Arbitration Clauses? 25 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 433, 435-37 (2010); Hon. Curtis E. von
Kann, A Report Card on the Quality of Commercial Arbitration: Assessing and Improving
Delivery of the Benefits Customers Seek, 7 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 499, 500-01 (2009);
see also Loukas Mistelis & Crina Baltag, Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards
and Settlement in International Arbitration: Corporate Attitudes and Practices, 18 AM. REV.
INT’L ARB. 319, 320, 322 (2008) (explaining a 2008 survey of corporate attitudes towards
international commercial arbitration, but also useful with respect to commercial arbitration,
more generally).
44
Stephen L. Hayford, Building a More Perfect Beast: Rethinking the Commercial
Arbitration Agreement, 7 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 437, 439 (2009) (explaining parties’
very fundamental desire for “a clear alternative to traditional litigation”).
45
See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 372 (3d ed. 1986) (suggesting
that the law should supply the terms the parties would have adopted had they addressed the
issue); Douglas Baird & Thomas Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper
Domain, 38 VAND. L. REV. 829, 835-36 (1985) (providing the parties with the term they
would have negotiated had they recognized the issue and had the time and money to address
it). But see Ayres & Gertner, supra note 37, at 90-91 (suggesting that the most efficient
default terms will not always be those the parties would have wanted, but may sometimes be
those that at least one party does not favor).
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possibility of getting it wrong. In fact, the parties may perceive that their
agreement is fully complete—notwithstanding apparent gaps.
For example, the parties to an arbitration agreement may have simply
provided for binding arbitration before a single arbitrator chosen by the
parties. While one might suggest that this agreement leaves a rather large gap
with respect to the arbitral procedure, it might also be that the parties simply
intended to grant the arbitrator complete discretion with respect to procedure.46 If so, then perhaps the agreement does not really include any gaps
at all.
The FAA does not speak directly to this possibility.47 However, the
UNCITRAL Model Law provides a potential indication of the parties’ likely
normative views. Article 19(2) provides that an “arbitral tribunal may,
subject to the provisions of [the UNCITRAL Model Law], conduct the
arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate.”48 One might
reasonably infer that this represents a commercial norm suggesting that the
parties often prefer broad grants of discretion to the arbitrators. However, this
apparently broad grant of authority comes in the context of a very well
developed set of default rules governing many of the most common
procedures likely to arise in arbitral proceedings.49 Thus, it is much more
difficult to draw any inference that parties would typically grant complete
discretion to arbitrators in the absence of any default rules. Moreover, any
exercise of arbitrator discretion presupposes the existence of an arbitrator to
exercise that discretion and, without at least some sort of default rule
regarding the appointment of an arbitrator, effectuation of the parties’
agreement to arbitrate is impossible.50
Once an arbitrator has been chosen, the parties may grant that arbitrator
broad authority to decide their dispute on equitable principles without
46

See Alan Scott Rau, Federal Common Law and Arbitral Power, 8 NEV. L.J. 169, 18081 (2007) (suggesting “unfettered arbitral discretion and control” as the “universally
accepted ‘meta gap-filler’”).
47
See id. Though, one might argue that the FAA speaks indirectly to the issue by largely
omitting any gap fillers. Seemingly, this is Professor Rau’s view in suggesting the lack of
need for specific FAA gap fillers. See id.
48
UNCITRAL Model Law—2006 Amendment, supra note 26, art. 19(2).
49
See, e.g., id. art. 17.
50
One of the very few default rules provided by the FAA is that, if the parties cannot
agree, a court shall appoint an arbitrator. 9 U.S.C § 5 (2006). Court appointment is not,
however, the only option. Many institutional rules provide for appointment by the institution.
See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION
PROCEDURES 8 r.11 (2010); UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, G.A. Res. 31/98, art. 6, U.N.
GAOR, 31st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/31/98 (Dec. 15, 1976) (providing for designation of any
appointing authority by the Permanent Court of arbitration).
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reference to any particular substantive law.51 This sort of arbitrator authority
might also suggest a broad discretionary norm. However, arbitral rules
addressing the issue require the parties’ express consent to grant the arbitrator
such broad discretionary power over the substance of their dispute.52 In the
same vein, the parties are unlikely to have intended a grant of virtually
unlimited procedural discretion in the absence of a clear indication of that
intent. Thus, the parties’ intentions are most likely served by default terms
reflecting those they would have likely agreed upon in the event they had
addressed the issues in question.
C. What Sort of Default Rules Might Be Appropriate for Filling Gaps in
Incomplete Arbitration Agreements?
The classic “majoritarian” approach to default rules is to seek to
determine the rule that most similarly situated parties would have wanted had
they actually considered and negotiated the issue at the time of contracting.53
In contrast, one of the most commonly discussed alternatives is the “penalty”
default approach.54 The basic idea of a penalty default is that the default rule
should be designed to be a rule disfavored by a party likely to possess
information useful to its contracting partner.55 The party with the relevant
information is, therefore, faced with the option of either accepting a rule it
does not like or disclosing the information.56 In the case of arbitration
agreements, a “majoritarian” approach is likely to be the most appropriate.
Penalty defaults are most appropriate when the ex ante cost of contracting
is relatively cheap.57 However, the cost of contracting for specific details of

51

See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N & INT’L CTR. FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, INT’L
DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES 13 art.28(1) (2009).
52
Id. at art.28(3).
53
Joshua Fairfield, The Cost of Consent: Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Contract, 58 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1441-42 (2009); Ayres & Gertner, supra note 37, at 93.
54
Fairfield, supra note 53; see Ayres & Gertner, supra note 37, at 97. One of the classic
examples of a penalty default is the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, which provides that
consequential damages are limited by foreseeability. 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 150 (1854). The
party contracting for carriage is faced with either accepting a limit on liability for late
delivery or disclosing to its contracting partner information as to the potentially large losses
it might suffer with respect to late delivery. Id. With such information in hand, the carrier can
negotiate over whether it is willing to accept such risks and at what price. Id.
55
Ayres & Gertner, supra note 37, at 97.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 93.
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an arbitration agreement is likely to be particularly high.58 Moreover, it
seems unlikely that, at the time of contracting, either party would be
strategically withholding information regarding a potential arbitration process
that the other might value in negotiating a more detailed arbitration agreement.59 A majoritarian approach also seems particularly appropriate when
one looks at commercial arbitration from a normative perspective.
To a large degree, most business parties to a commercial arbitration
agreement share the same general expectations. In choosing arbitration of a
dispute arising out of a commercial, business-to-business transaction, the
parties are typically interested in the following characteristics:
• Arbitration is generally perceived as faster than litigation and,
at least to the extent it is faster, cheaper than litigation;60
• Arbitration is generally perceived as more flexible and less
adversarial than litigation;
• The parties may choose their decision-maker for his or her
expertise, thereby leading to more accurate outcomes;
• Arbitration is private and largely confidential;61 and
• The decision of the arbitrator is final, thus bringing closure to
the dispute and allowing the parties to return to any remaining
business relationship.62
When the transaction crosses national borders, the parties to an international commercial arbitration agreement share the same expectations listed
above, but also typically choose arbitration for two additional reasons:
58

See supra Part I.A.
At the time of contract conclusion, it seems unlikely that either party would be
sufficiently prescient to know what information it might strategically withhold from the other
or, in contrast, disclose in attempting to negotiate around a disfavored default rule.
60
The cost of the arbitrator makes this aspect of arbitration more expensive than
litigation. However, the speed and efficiency of arbitration are generally thought to more
than compensate for this cost, thus reducing the overall cost of the process. But see JACKSON
WILLIAMS, PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE COSTS OF ARBITRATION 61-67 (Frank Clemente et al. eds.,
2002), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACF11 0A.PDF.
61
The parties may agree upon a confidentiality requirement within the arbitration
proceedings themselves. See, e.g., JAMS, COMPREHENSIVE ARBITRATION RULES AND
PROCEDURES 27 r.26(a) (2009). They may also agree upon a requirement that the parties, the
arbitrators, and any institution maintain such confidentiality outside of the proceedings. See,
e.g., LCIA, ARBITRATION RULES, art. 30.1 (1998). However, any such agreement is subject
to required disclosures pursuant to judicial proceedings. JAMS, supra; LCIA, supra. Thus,
the benefit of confidentiality is often lost when parties end up in court over issues arising out
of the arbitration agreement.
62
See, e.g., Drahozal & Ware, supra note 43, at 451-52; Kann, supra note 43, at 500-01.
59
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• Arbitration provides a neutral forum, as compared to national
courts; and
• Arbitration awards are generally easier to enforce in a national
jurisdiction other than that in which they are issued.63
These latter two attributes related to international transactions in no way
conflict with the former list of more general characteristics. Thus, there is no
apparent reason why a set of default rules for domestic commercial
arbitration would necessarily need to be any different from those suitable for
international commercial arbitration.
We can also find significant agreement on those attributes of arbitration
agreements that parties find least attractive, most of which relate to the
increased costs and delay associated with two things: (1) the increasing
tendency of lawyers—especially American lawyers—to turn arbitration into
something that looks very much like litigation;64 and (2) court proceedings in
connection with an arbitration agreement.65 Each of these concerns can, to
some degree, be minimized with an appropriate set of default rules.66
A regime of default rules for arbitration based on a majoritarian approach
would, therefore, likely include rules providing for a relatively expeditious,
inexpensive, cooperative and flexible means of dispute resolution before a
neutral expert decision maker; conducted in a private and confidential setting;
and culminating in a final, and fully enforceable award, deciding the merits
of the parties’ dispute, all with as little court intervention as possible.
Admittedly, there are several important variations on this general theme, and
frequent variations are found in institutional arbitration rules. However, these
variations in rules are in no way inconsistent with the premise that a
63

See, e.g., Drahozal & Ware, supra note 43, at 452; MORRISSEY & GRAVES, supra note
8, at 312-15.
64
See, e.g., Steven Seidenberg, International Arbitration Loses Its Grip: Are U.S.
Lawyers to Blame? 96 A.B.A. J. 50, 51 (2010); see also Hayford, supra note 44, at 438-39
(pointing out the stark difference between clients’ interest in efficient and cost effective
dispute resolution and the lawyer’s interest in fighting to win every possible battle
irrespective of the costs or effectiveness of doing so).
65
See, e.g., Lou Whiteman, Arbitration’s Fall from Grace, CORPORATE COUNSEL (July
13, 2006), http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1152695125655.
66
The third concern about arbitration is that of the inability to join other parties to the
dispute who are not parties to the arbitration agreement. While some national laws and
institutional rules have begun to address this issue in a limited manner, arbitral jurisdiction is
ultimately based on consent, and, without consent, joinder is likely to remain a challenge. As
such, this issue is not addressed in the context of this default rules analysis.
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substantial majority of parties to an arbitration agreement are looking for the
same general characteristics in resolving their dispute. For example, one
might analogize a set of arbitration rules to the rules of carriage found in
standard shipping terms, such as “Ex Works,” “Free on Board,” or “Cost,
Insurance, and Freight.”67 However, the fact that parties may choose terms of
carriage that differ on important issues in no way undermines the value of the
default rules found in uniform sales law, such as Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.) Article 2 or the United Nations Convention on the International Sale
of Goods.68 In a similar fashion, a set of default rules governing commercial
arbitration would provide a valuable baseline in filling gaps in the parties’
agreement in the absence of any express choice—either directly or by incorporation.
It is often said that arbitration is based entirely on consent.69 When
business parties fail to contract around a set of established default legal rules,
the parties might reasonably be said to have tacitly consented to these rules
by their silence.70 However, such an inference is only reasonable if (1) the
parties had reason to know of the default rule and (2) the cost of contracting
around the rule is not prohibitive.71 The latter issue, in particular, presents a
problem in the context of an arbitration agreement because, as discussed
earlier, the costs of negotiating an arbitration agreement may often be
unusually high.72 Whether such costs are sufficiently high to preclude an
inference of tacit consent, the issue is at least a problematic one in terms of
inferring consent from silence. However, even where parties cannot be said
to have tacitly consented via silence, the imposition of default legal rules
“may still be justified on the grounds of consent when default rules are
chosen to reflect the common sense or conventional understanding of most
parties.”73
In contracting for arbitration, “the parties’ subjective intent is most likely
to be satisfied by a default rule that interprets manifested consent to reflect
the commonsense or conventional expectations that are likely part of the tacit
67

International Chamber of Commerce, Incoterms 2010, http://www.iccwbo.org/
incoterms/id3040/index.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2011) [hereinafter Incoterms 2010].
68
See infra Part II.D for a more developed comparison of default contract terms, adopted
by way of incorporation, with default legal rules, adopted by choosing a particular seat for
the arbitration.
69
CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT,
COURSE ON DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE, INVESTMENT AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 5 (2003).
70
Barnett, supra note 36, at 826.
71
Id. at 866.
72
See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
73
Barnett, supra note 36, at 827.
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assumptions of particular parties.”74 Such commonsense expectations are
those normative expectations shared by most people choosing arbitration for
dispute resolution. Thus, where default rules are based on a strong,
majoritarian set of commercial norms, they may be said to reflect the
commonly held consent of the commercial arbitration community. To some
degree, this argument might be made in support of any set of normative
default rules, such as U.C.C. Article 2.75 However, the normative force of
expectations within the arbitration community is arguably even greater than
in most such identifiable transactional communities, as those common sense
expectations tend to be particularly pervasive within that community. Thus,
majoritarian default rules governing arbitration agreements may be reasonably characterized as reflecting the general consent of those businesses
choosing to resolve their disputes through arbitration.
The final issue regarding the nature of default rules is the extent to which
such rules might be tailored to the particular circumstances of specific
parties.76 Perhaps one of the most significant choices in dispute resolution
generally and arbitration in particular is the choice between speed and cost on
the one hand and reaching the “correct” decision on the other. This apparent
tension need not necessarily present any conflict at all, as many disputes can
be arbitrated quickly, inexpensively, and accurately—without sacrificing any
of these virtues. However, to the extent these concerns may sometimes
conflict, the parties’ expectations at the time of contracting may differ
depending on the nature of the transaction subject to resolution of disputes
through arbitration. If so, it may be worth considering whether default rules
can be tailored to address this particular potential difference in expectations.
The most significant critique of arbitration today comes from the cost and
delay associated with long, protracted proceedings,77 and the business community is increasingly calling for a more expeditious, cost effective process.78
However, in at least some instances, business parties may value getting the
74

Id. at 880.
Such “common sense” rules might be contrasted with those that would not be part of
the commonsense expectations of most commercial parties. For example, the default rules
regarding the division of partnership profits seem quite contrary to common sense in many
circumstances. Id. at 884.
76
Ayres & Gertner, supra note 37, at 91-92 (noting the distinction between tailored and
untailored defaults).
77
Seidenberg, supra note 64, at 51; see also Hayford, supra note 44, at 438-39 (noting
business decision makers concerns with delay and opportunity costs).
78
See, e.g., Hayford, supra note 44, at 438-39; Peter Morton, Can a World Exist Where
Expedited Arbitration Becomes the Default Procedure? 26 ARB. INT’L 103, 104 (2010).
75
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“correct” result over efficiency. Thus, a set of default legal rules governing
arbitration might distinguish between default rules applicable in expedited
arbitration and those applicable in non-expedited arbitration.79 One option
would be to leave this distinction to the arbitrators to make a determination
on a case-by-case basis, depending on what is “reasonable in the
circumstances.”80 While it is difficult to identify any singular method for
distinguishing between the parties’ expectations in all circumstances, the size
of the transaction will often provide a strong indication.81
In any event, this potential conflict between efficiency and accuracy is
one of the differences between party expectations most likely to lead to a
need for tailored defaults,82 and any set of default legal rules governing
arbitration should consider and address this and any other such issues.
However, the need for a few select, tailored default rules in no way precludes
a largely majoritarian approach to the provision of default legal rules
governing incomplete agreements to arbitrate.
In thinking about a set of default legal rules governing arbitration, it is
also worth considering the broader structural framework for such rules. For
this purpose, Article 2 of the U.C.C.,83 as well as the Uniform Partnership
Act (both original and revised),84 provide useful analogies.

79

For example—and only by way of example—the former might provide default rules
requiring only a single arbitrator, minimal discovery, and short time frames for submission
of pleadings, while the latter might provide for three arbitrators and greater opportunity for
discovery. One might also suggest, in the latter case, an opportunity for some sort of
substantive appellate review—an option arguably foreclosed under the FAA. See Hall St.
Assoc. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584 (2008) (holding that the provisions for review of
an arbitrator’s decision under sections 10 and 11 are exclusive).
80
Ayres & Gertner, supra note 37, at 91-92. This approach is used in a variety of
provisions within U.C.C. Article 2. See, e.g., U.C.C § 2-206 (2005) (contract offer “inviting
acceptance” when in manner “reasonable in the circumstances”).
81
See, e.g., THE CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY OF BASEL, BERN, GENEVA,
NEUCHÂTEL, TICINO, VAUD AND ZURICH, SWISS RULES OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 21
art.42 (2006) (providing a default rule for expedited arbitration of disputes of less than one
million Swiss Francs).
82
The Swiss Rules actually contemplate both a discretionary tailored rule based on the
“complexity of the subject matter and/or the amount in dispute.” Id. at 9 art.6(2) (providing
for discretion as to the number of arbitrators), as well as a “bright line” tailored rule. Id. at 21
art.42(2) (providing for expedited procedures below a certain amount in dispute).
83
U.C.C. §§ 2-305, -308, -309 (providing default terms for incomplete contracts).
84
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT
1 (1997) (stating in the Prefatory Note that the Act is “largely a series of default rules that
govern the relations among partners in situations they have not addressed in a partnership
agreement”), available at http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/Home_desktop default.aspx (follow
“Final Acts & Legislation” link; then find the act in “Select an Act Title” box).
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D. Arbitration Agreements as Nominate Contracts?
The treatment of sales and partnership as unique and specific forms of
contract goes back to Roman law, where each was treated as a form of
nominate contract, complete with its own set of default provisions.85 The
French Civil Code also treated arbitration as a nominate contract—a
distinction still maintained today in the civil codes of Louisiana and
Quebec.86 In the case of such nominate contracts, a code will necessarily
provide for a default set of rights and obligations, which will govern the
parties’ agreement in the absence of any contrary intent. While the theoretical
underpinnings of traditional civilian nominate contracts and common law
default rules are admittedly distinct, the basic ideas are sufficiently similar to
be worthy of our consideration in drawing possible analogies. This civil law
approach to codification of traditional nominate contracts is, to some degree,
reflected in the U.S. approach to codification of the law governing the sale of
goods and partnerships—two of the oldest forms of nominate contracts.87 As
another traditional form of nominate contract, arbitration arguably deserves a
comparable comprehensive and systematic approach to codification.
In his campaign for enactment of a uniform commercial code governing,
inter alia, sales of goods, Professor Karl Llewellyn often pointed to the cost
of uncertainty in commercial transactions governed by common law as being
a result of the uncertainty linked with the outcome being determintated by the
highest court of the relevant jurisdiction.88 Llewellyn sought to avoid that
uncertainty by providing a highly structured set of default legal rules governing the parties’ transactions in the absence of any contrary intent.89 He
employed a normative approach to drafting these rules and weaved the
individual provisions together in a comprehensive and systematic mosaic
within which its own fabric often provides the basis for filling any remaining
gaps.90 While perhaps not as storied as Llewellyn’s drafting of the U.C.C.,
the uniform laws governing partnership agreements in this country provide
additional examples of comprehensive and systemic codifications of a
85

BARRY NICHOLAS, FRENCH LAW OF CONTRACT 46 (1982).
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4201-:4217 (2010); Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 2005,
c. 18 (Can.).
87
See supra notes 83-84.
88
Shael Herman, The Fate and the Future of Codification in America, 40 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 407, 428-29 (1996).
89
Id. at 429-31.
90
Id. at 428-29.
86
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specific form of contract that could otherwise be governed by the common
law of contracts.91
As explained more fully below, the same sort of uncertainty Llewellyn
spoke of, over fifty years ago, exists today with arbitration agreements
governed by the FAA—a bare bones statute largely displaced by federal
“common law.”92 Instead of providing a comprehensive and systematic
approach to the law governing arbitration, the FAA relies almost entirely on
the common law of contracts, along with the developing federal common law
governing those unanswered common law of contracts questions.93 There is
no good reason why arbitration contracts do not deserve the same thoughtful
statutory treatment the law provides to other unique contracts, such as those
for the sale of goods or partnership.94
The vast majority of other modern legal systems have done much more
than the United States to develop default legal rules governing arbitration.95
The UNCITRAL Model Law (adopted, at least in part, by over fifty countries
and seven U.S. states)96 contains a well-developed and reasonably comprehensive set of default provisions systematically addressing many of the
issues that might arise under an arbitration agreement that does not
incorporate a complete set of private institutional or ad hoc rules.97 A number
of other countries, including France and England, have their own unique
default legal regimes governing arbitration—somewhat different from the
Model Law, but each far more comprehensive than the FAA.98
Admittedly, not every incomplete contract should be completed by
reference to default rules and not every type of contract requires a uniquely
tailored statutory scheme.99 However, the unique and specialized nature of an
91

See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
Margaret Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How The Supreme Court Created a
Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 99-100
(2006).
93
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (stating that an arbitration agreement is valid “save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract”).
94
One might ask at this stage if arbitration ought to be governed by uniform state law
instead of federal law. In fact, a number of states have adopted either the original Uniform
Arbitration Act or the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act. See infra notes 248 & 257 and
accompanying text. However, as more fully explained in Part II.C infra, the use of state law
to cure the current ills of the FAA is fraught with its own set of perils.
95
See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 26; NOUVEAU CODE DE PROCÉDURE
CIVILE [N.C.P.C.] art. 1442-1507 (Fr.) [hereinafter Arbitration Rules of France]; Arbitration
Act 1996, c. 23 (Eng.) [hereinafter English Arbitration Act].
96
Status: 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 26.
97
See generally id.
98
See Arbitration Rules of France, supra note 95; English Arbitration Act, supra note 95.
99
See Lisa Bernstein, Social Norms and Default Rules Analysis, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
92
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arbitration agreement,100 coupled with a significant body of strong and wellestablished commercial norms surrounding such an agreement,101 would
seem to demand a unique and comprehensive statute governing domestic and
international commercial arbitration in this country.102
II. FILLING THE GAPS: POTENTIAL SOURCES OF DEFAULT RULES
The FAA governs both domestic and international arbitration.103
Domestic arbitration is governed by Chapter 1,104 while international
arbitration is governed by Chapters 2105 and 3.106 The original FAA (Chapter
1) provides for enforcement of domestic agreements to arbitrate and grants
the parties broad autonomy in structuring such arbitration,107 while providing
very few default rules to guide the parties who fail to exercise that autonomy.108 Therefore, when one is faced with a “gap” in the details of the
parties’ agreement to arbitrate, the FAA provides little guidance in filling that
gap.109
Chapter 2 of the FAA addresses foreign and other “non-domestic” agreements to arbitrate110 and provides for the application of the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York
Convention) to such arbitration agreements and any resulting awards.111
Chapter 3 of the FAA also addresses foreign and other “non-domestic”
agreements to arbitrate,112 but provides for the application of the InterAmerican Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (the Panama
L.J. 59, 67 (1993).
100
See Imre S. Szalai, The Federal Arbitration Act and the Jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 319, 321 (2007).
101
See IAN R. MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & THOMAS J. STIPANOVICH, FEDERAL
ARBITRATION LAW § 7.1.2.1 (1999).
102
This idea is more fully discussed infra, Parts II.B-D.
103
See Szalai, supra note 100, at 325.
104
9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).
105
Id. §§ 201-208.
106
Id. §§ 301-307.
107
Id. §§ 1-16. While a few new sections have been added to the FAA, such as those on
appeal, 9 U.S.C. § 16, and the legal effect of the statute has arguably changed significantly
through the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. See generally Moses, supra note
92. The text of the original 1925 statute remains largely unchanged today.
108
See Moses, supra note 92, at 111-112.
109
See generally 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307.
110
Id. §§ 201-208.
111
Id. § 201; New York Convention, supra note 6, § 201.
112
See 9 U.S.C. §§ 301-307.
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Convention)113 to arbitration agreements in which the majority of the parties
are citizens of signatory states to the Panama Convention.114 While Chapters
2 and 3 serve their intended purposes of giving effect to these respective
Conventions, their interaction with FAA Chapter 1 also raises some issues of
uncertainty in their application.115 In addition the Panama Convention raises
a unique issue because of its adoption of a complete set of default rules of the
Inter-American Arbitration Commission.116
As more fully explained below, this broad, vague attempt at “statutory
dépeçage”117 fails for at least two reasons. First, the overall statute is
insufficiently detailed in providing default provisions.118 Second, many of the
details it does provide in international transactions do not mesh well with the
law governing domestic transactions, and the overall structure of the statute
arguably creates as many questions as it resolves.119
A. The Current State of American Federal Law Governing Commercial
Arbitration
Congress enacted the FAA in 1925120 for the specific purpose of
overcoming “centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration agreements121” and
enforcing contracts on an equal basis with other common law contracts.122
Since that time, the United States Supreme Court has given broad effect to
this purpose in both federal and state courts123 and has consistently resisted
113

Id. at § 301. See generally Panama Convention, supra note 7.
9 U.S.C. § 305(1) (2006).
115
See Park, The Specificity of International Arbitration, supra note 8, at 1248.
116
See 9 U.S.C. § 306(a) (2006); Panama Convention, supra note 7, 1 art.3. See generally
SICE, Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Arbitration Commission , COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION AND OTHER ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION METHODS (July 1, 1988)
[hereinafter IACAC Rules], available at http://www.sice.oas.org/dispute/comarb
/iacac/rop_e.asp. This incorporation of a complete set of default rules is unique in American
arbitration law.
117
“Dépeçage” is the process whereby a single legal relationship may be governed by
different laws. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 469-470 (8th ed. 2004). The term seems
appropriate here, where the FAA attempts to apply a collection of separate and independent
legal instruments to govern a single contractual relationship—the agreement to arbitrate an
international commercial dispute.
118
See Drahozal, New Experiences of International Commercial Arbitration, supra note
15, at 236.
119
See Park, The Specificity of International Arbitration, supra note 8, at 1248.
120
Szalai, supra note 100, at 325.
121
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 (1974).
122
Id. at 510-11.
123
See generally Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (holding the FAA
applies in state courts, as well as federal courts). This was arguably the single most important
114
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state efforts to limit the enforcement of arbitration agreements on any
grounds other than those applying broadly to any and all contracts.124 For
those favoring arbitration generally as a means of binding dispute resolution,
the FAA would seem to be a resounding success in achieving its original
goal.125 However, the parties to an arbitration agreement are likely seeking
more than just enforceability of their agreement—they are also likely trying
to stay out of court altogether.126 In this respect, the FAA, as interpreted by
the Supreme Court, and as amended by Congress to accommodate international treaties, has arguably been far less successful.127
1. The Federal Arbitration Act: The Minimalist Approach to Domestic
Arbitration Under Chapter 1
The loadstar rule of FAA Chapter 1 is found in section 2,128 which
provides that an agreement “to settle by arbitration a controversy … shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract.”129 An arbitration agreement is
fully binding as long as: (1) the parties agree in writing to final and binding
arbitration and (2) the dispute in question falls within the scope of the
arbitration agreement.130 Of course, many arbitration agreements will provide
decision the Supreme Court has ever issued with respect to the FAA, because it preempted
efforts by the states to regulate arbitration—at least to the extent such efforts were contrary
to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of FAA article 2. Moreover, the preemption issues left
open by Southland and subsequent Supreme Court cases are largely responsible for the
uncertainty surrounding current state laws purporting to govern certain elements of
arbitration. The original Southland decision drew a vigorous and well reasoned dissent. See
id. at 21-36 (O’Connor, J. and Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). At least one justice is still
fighting the battle lost in Southland. See, e.g., Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna,
546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting based on his view that the FAA does not
apply in state court proceedings).
124
See, e.g., Doctor’s Assoc., Inc., v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686-88 (1996).
125
See Moses, supra note 92, at 99-100.
126
See John M. Townsend, Drafting Arbitration Clauses Avoiding the 7 Deadly Sins, 58
DISP. RESOL. J. 28, 31 (2003). Even if court intervention is unnecessary to give effect to the
parties’ arbitration agreement, a party may find it necessary to resort to courts regarding
remedies such as specific relief, which are generally unavailable from the arbitral tribunal.
127
See, e.g., Moses, supra note 92, at 101.
128
David Horton, Essay, The Mandatory Core of Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration
Act, 96 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 1, 4 (2010), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/
2010/04/02/horton.pdf.
129
See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
130
See MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 101, at § 7.1.2.1.
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substantially more detail, either within the arbitration agreement itself, or by
way of incorporation of a specific set of arbitration rules.131 Freedom of
contract lies at the heart of commercial arbitration, with the parties granted
broad autonomy in designing their own mechanism for the resolution of
disputes.132 Moreover, parties are encouraged to exercise this broad autonomy by thoughtfully and carefully crafting an arbitration regime meeting
their specific needs.133 However, the parties do not always exercise this
autonomy in any great detail,134 and their agreement to arbitrate will be
enforced whether or not they provide such detail.135
For example, the parties to an agreement might provide that “[a]ny
disputes arising out of this Agreement will be finally resolved by binding
arbitration.”136 The parties would almost certainly be bound to resolve their
relevant contract disputes by arbitration.137 However, with such a minimalist
arbitration agreement, they would have to look outside the FAA to ascertain
the details of such arbitration.138 In theory, the law governing the arbitration
should supply the default provisions necessary to fill any gaps.139 Unfortunately for the arbitrating parties, the FAA provides very little guidance
in this respect.140
In comparison with most modern arbitration statutes, the FAA is a “barebones statute directed primarily at insuring that courts give effect to arbitration clauses and awards, and prescribes no significant procedural
131

Id.
See Stipanowich, supra note 12, at 405.
133
Id. at 403.
134
See id. at 405.
135
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
136
Townsend, supra note 126, at 31. Townsend suggests that this clause represents an
extreme example of poor drafting. Id. However, this author has seen many such clauses in
actual contracts drafted by both lawyers and laypeople.
137
Id.
138
Id. Of course, the parties could agree, after the dispute had arisen, to conduct the
arbitration in a particular manner or according to a particular set of rules. However, it is
common knowledge that, once a dispute has arisen, it is often difficult to get parties in an
adversarial posture to agree on anything. For purposes of the foregoing analysis, I will
assume that the parties are unable to reach consensus on any of the pertinent issues.
139
See MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 101, at § 7.1.2.1; see also ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN
HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 3-42 (Sweet
& Maxwell Ltd. eds., 4th ed. 2004) (explaining that, in international commercial arbitration,
gaps are filled by reference to the governing arbitration law—typically that of the place of
arbitration); Carbonneau, supra note 15, at 418 (pointing out that many of the procedural
details of arbitration—about which the parties may disagree—can be resolved by reference
to the law governing the arbitration, to the extent not addressed by the parties’ agreement).
140
See Drahozal, New Experiences of International Commercial Arbitration, supra note
15, at 236.
132
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standards.”141 The FAA simply fails to answer many of the questions
essential to the conduct of arbitration proceedings.142 As such, if the parties
fail to answer these questions in their original agreement and cannot do so
after the dispute has arisen, the questions all too often end up in court, thus
arguably defeating the parties’ original purpose in agreeing to arbitrate in the
first place.143
Whatever one may think of the FAA, it would seem, beyond any rational
argument to the contrary, that Chapter 1 does not itself fulfill any significant
role in filling “gaps” by way of default rules.144 Thus, our next question is
whether such gaps may reasonably be filled by the courts,145 by state law,146
or by arbitration rules.147 Each of these will be addressed in turn below.
However, before leaving the FAA behind, a few final issues are worth noting.
2. The Federal Arbitration Act: The Rest of Chapter 1
While the primary focus of this Article is default legal rules, this Article
will also address a few other key legal rules under FAA Chapter 1, some of
which are mandatory.148 While this Article ultimately suggests that the FAA
be fully replaced—not amended—certain of these additional provisions are
important to understanding other attempts to “fill the gaps” in the parties’
agreement, as well as some of the other challenges presented by the existing
legal structure.

141

Id. (quoting Alan Scott Rau & Edward F. Sherman, Tradition and Innovation in
International Arbitration Procedure, 30 TEX. INT’L L.J. 89, 90 n.3 (1995)).
142
See id. at 238.
143
One of the greatest criticisms of arbitration today is the fact that parties bargaining for
arbitration end up in court attempting to enforce their agreement. See, e.g., Whiteman, supra
note 65, at 1 (explaining that “[o]ur company ended up investing more than a year’s worth of
time and substantial legal fees simply to enforce in court our right not to have to go to
court”). It is worth considering at this juncture that a positive agreement to arbitrate is also,
to a large degree, a negative agreement to stay out of court. As such, a need to resort to court
in order to conduct the agreed upon arbitration proceedings would seem anathema to a basic
agreement to arbitrate. This issue is explored more fully infra Part II.B.
144
See generally 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).
145
See infra Part II.B.
146
See infra Part II.C.
147
See infra Part II.D.
148
Most provisions of Chapter 1, including section 2, rely entirely on party consent and
are, therefore, subject to the parties’ right to override them—provided, of course, that the
parties can agree. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16.
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FAA sections 3 and 4 provide for motions in federal court to stay any
pending court action or compel the parties to arbitrate a dispute subject to a
valid arbitration agreement under section 2.149 One might reasonably read
section 4 as providing a mandatory rule that the court must determine
whether the parties entered into a valid arbitration agreement and whether the
dispute is within its scope.150 However, the Supreme Court has apparently
held otherwise, ruling that this is merely a default rule, which the parties may
displace if they would prefer to grant the arbitrators jurisdiction to make
these threshold decisions as to their own jurisdiction over the merits of the
dispute.151 This issue is more fully explored in Part II.E below.152
Assuming that the parties’ agreement mandates arbitration of the dispute
in question, the next potentially relevant provisions are those applicable to
the proceedings themselves.153 Section 5 provides a default rule for appointment of arbitrators where one of the parties refuses to cooperate in
constituting the panel.154 The court is to make the appointment consistent
with the parties’ agreement, or, in the absence of any agreement, choose a
single arbitrator.155 The statute does not, however, provide any guidance as to
how the court might go about exercising such a choice.156
Section 7 provides for court assistance in enforcing a subpoena issued by
an arbitration panel.157 However, Chapter 1 contains nothing more concerning the actual conduct of the arbitration from the time the tribunal is
constituted through its issuance of a final award,158 which brings us to the last
set of issues—those arising after an award has been issued.
Section 9 provides for confirmation of an award: the process by which a
private award is transformed into an enforceable public judgment.159 This
section provides a time limit for confirmations, a notice requirement, and
jurisdiction, but otherwise mandates that an award shall be confirmed absent
149

Id. §§ 3-4.
See generally Horton, supra note 128 (claiming that section 4 is mandatory).
151
See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) (explaining in
dicta that “the question ‘who has the primary power to decide arbitrability’ turns upon what
the parties agreed about that matter” (emphasis in original)); Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v.
Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, n.1 (2010) (applying the First Options dicta to a “clear and
unmistakable” delegation of this decisional power to the arbitrator).
152
See infra Part II.E.
153
See generally 9 U.S.C. §§ 5-16.
154
Id. § 5.
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id. § 7.
158
See generally id. §§ 1-16.
159
Id. § 9. A motion for confirmation must be made within one year.
150
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grounds for vacation under section 10, or modification or correction under
section 11.160 Section 10 provides a narrow set of grounds for vacation,
which might reasonably be summarized as mandating an arbitration process
that comports with due process; is untainted by fraud, corruption, or bias; and
is ultimately derived from the consent of the parties,161 while section 11
provides for modification or correction of certain clerical mistakes or issues
in which the arbitrators went beyond the consent of the parties.162 Lastly,
appeals of lower court decisions at any stage of the process are addressed by
section 16, which generally makes decisions contrary to arbitration subject to
immediate appeal,163 while decisions favorable to arbitration may not be
appealed until the process is complete through confirmation or vacation.164
Thus, we might reasonably summarize the key elements of FAA Chapter
1 by breaking down the governing law into three parts: (1) “front end” issues
as to whether the dispute is subject to arbitration; (2) “arbitration procedure”
issues involving actual arbitral process, from the constitution of the tribunal
through the issuance of a final award; and (3) “back end” issues involving
modification, confirmation, vacation, and/or enforcement of the award.165
Along with the basic enforceability provisions found in section 2,166 the only
significant additional front end rule is the default rule reflected in sections 3
and 4 that courts determine whether the arbitrators have jurisdiction to hear
the basic dispute.167 FAA Chapter 1 has only two significant default rules on
arbitration procedure—one regarding the appointment of an arbitrator and
one providing arbitrators with the power to subpoena witnesses.168
Most of the back end issues involve mandatory rules, and FAA Chapter 1
provides an appropriately limited set of bases for vacation, modification, or
correction.169 These bases for vacation in section 10 present other challenges,
which will be addressed later in this part, as well as Part II.E infra.170
160

Id.
Id. § 10.
162
Id. § 11.
163
Id. § 16(a).
164
Id. § 16(b).
165
While one might reasonably break arbitration law down in a variety of ways, this
Article will take what is, essentially, the same approach as the drafters of the Revised
Uniform Arbitration Act. See RUAA, supra note 28, at Prefatory Note pp. 2-3, 5 (alluding to
“front end” issues, “back end” issues, and “purely procedural dimensions of the arbitration
process”).
166
9 U.S.C. § 2.
167
See Szalai, supra note 100, at 326.
168
See generally 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16.
169
Id. §§ 10-11. For purposes of this Article, I will omit further reference to section 16 on
161
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Notably, each of the above default rules involves direct resort to the
courts, and the rule regarding appointment of arbitrators provides no
guidance for a court in fulfilling its duties. Instead of providing default
provisions defining the rights and obligations of the parties and thereby
filling any gaps in their agreement, FAA Chapter 1 simply sends the parties
to the courts to resolve the issue—assuming it addresses the issue at all.171
This approach is seemingly at odds with the most basic idea of arbitration—
the resolution of the parties’ dispute without resort to the courts.
The default rule that courts determine whether the parties have agreed to
arbitration says nothing about which of these threshold jurisdictional issues
should be determined by a court and which should be determined by the
arbitrators.172 As a result, this has been an often litigated issue, in some cases
reaching the Supreme Court.173 Again, this issue is explored more fully in
Part II.E below.174
The FAA also says nothing about its application in state courts. While the
Supreme Court has, since 1984, unequivocally stated that section 2 applies in
state courts,175 the preemptive effects of the remainder of Chapter 1 are far
less certain. The Supreme Court’s interpretation of section 2, coupled with
the express language of sections 3 and 4, would seem to produce the odd
result that the FAA governs actions in state court, but such actions cannot be
removed to federal court absent diversity jurisdiction.176 The open issues
involving preemption beyond section 2 call into serious question the relevance of state arbitration statutes that purport to govern many of the same
issues addressed by the FAA, as well as many issues to which the FAA does
not speak. This convoluted example of federalism gone haywire is explored
further in Part II.C below. At this point, it is sufficient to say that FAA
appeals, inasmuch as I do not believe its content is necessarily affected by the issues raised
below.
170
Id. § 10.
171
Id. §§ 10-11.
172
Id. §§ 3-4. This is not a single, unitary decision. By way of example, here are just a
few of the questions that might arise: Did the parties agree to arbitrate anything? Is the
instant dispute within the scope of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate? Is the contract
containing the arbitration clause itself voidable or void (the separability issue)? Is the dispute
subject to arbitration at all, or is it one that must be heard by courts based on public policy?
Have the parties complied with any preconditions to arbitration, such as a mediation process
that might be contractually required beforehand? Are each of the putative parties to the
arbitration actually parties to the agreement to arbitrate?
173
See, e.g., Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002).
174
Infra Part II.E..
175
Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
176
See 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4. These statutes, by their express language apply only in federal
court, and FAA Chapter 1 does not provide for federal question jurisdiction.
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Chapter 1 leaves some “front end” issues in a state that is unnecessarily
complicated and, in some cases, unresolved.
There is little case law on FAA “arbitration procedure,” which is hardly
surprising in view of the lack of FAA content addressing such issues. An
exemplary case in this area involved the potential applicability of California
state arbitration law, which provided for a stay of arbitration under certain
circumstances, pending the outcome of related court proceedings.177 The
outcome of this case presented anything but a clear picture with respect to the
applicability of state law in any but the most clear-cut of circumstances.178
While the FAA itself appears reasonably clear with respect to “back end”
issues, the courts have, nonetheless, fashioned their own additional nonstatutory grounds for vacating arbitration awards—the most notorious being
“manifest disregard of the law.”179 Again, the extent of FAA preemption is
uncertain and inconsistently applied by the courts.
At bottom, FAA Chapter 1 does a very effective job of making arbitration
agreements enforceable; however, what it gives with one hand, it takes away
with the other. While arbitration agreements are generally enforced, the
process of enforcing and executing those agreements all too often leads the
parties right back to court to fight about issues that have nothing to do with
their original contract dispute.180 It is no wonder that businesses are increasingly becoming frustrated with arbitration, as they end up “in a costly,
protracted court battle over an issue that, by contract, never should have
ended up in court at all.”181
3. The Federal Arbitration Act, Chapters 2 and 3: A Schizophrenic
Approach to Default Rules in International Arbitration?
The plot thickens as we move from domestic arbitration under FAA
Chapter 1 to international arbitration under Chapters 2 and 3. In theory,
Chapters 2 and 3182 were simply intended to implement the New York
Convention183 and the Panama Convention184 in the context of foreign
177

Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Stanford Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
See infra note 280.
179
See Park, The Specificity of International Arbitration, supra note 8, at 1249-51. But
see Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584-85 (2008) (arguably eliminating the
manifest disregard standard).
180
See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
181
Whiteman, supra note 65.
182
9 U.S.C. §§ 201, 301 (2006).
183
See generally New York Convention, supra note 6.
178
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arbitration agreements and awards under the FAA.185 FAA Chapter 1 would
still, however, apply to arbitration within the scope of either convention,
unless in conflict with Chapter 2 or 3, or the relevant convention.185
Inasmuch as both the New York and Panama Conventions deal primarily
with enforcement of foreign arbitration agreements and awards, one might
reasonably expect Chapters 2 and 3 to have little effect on arbitration
conducted in the United States. We will see, however, that the provisions of
these chapters have additional effects as well—at least some of which were
not likely intended by the drafters.
a. Arbitration Under the New York Convention
Chapter 2 applies to arbitration agreements falling under the New York
Convention—a convention that has been ratified by 145 countries.186 The
application of the New York Convention is not, however, limited to awards
made in foreign states. It also applies to awards that are not considered as
domestic awards in the state where their recognition and enforcement are
sought.187 FAA section 202 makes clear that any award that involves a
foreign party or foreign property, or envisages foreign performance or
enforcement is non-domestic—even if the arbitration takes place in the
United States and is governed by United States law.188 Thus, Chapter 2 would
apply, for example, to a transaction between United States parties that simply
envisaged some foreign performance or potential enforcement against foreign
assets. This broad definition of non-domestic awards solves one problem, but
creates another.
Section 203 provides federal question jurisdiction for all actions falling
under the New York Convention, including all non-domestic awards, as
defined in Section 202.189 As a result, the problem with the lack of federal

184

See generally Panama Convention, supra note 7.
FAA sections 201 and 301 are central to their respective chapters, inasmuch as they
each provide for enforcement of the respective conventions. See MACNEIL ET AL., supra 101,
at § 44.8.3.1 (1999).
185
Id.
186
Status: 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, UNCITRAL: U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW [hereinafter Status: 1958
Convention]
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html (last
visited Feb. 22, 2011).
187
New York Convention, supra note 6, at art. I(1).
188
9 U.S.C. § 202 (2006).
189
Id. § 203.
185
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question jurisdiction under Chapter 1190 disappears under Chapter 2. To the
extent that either party wishes to avail itself of the federal courts in enforcing
the provisions of Chapter 2, removal is available191—irrespective of diversity. Thus, the federal jurisdictional complexities associated with Chapter 1
are avoided. However, arbitration agreements subject to Chapter 2 remain
subject as well to the provisions of Chapter 1, to the extent not in conflict
with the provisions of Chapter 2 and the New York Convention.192
For example, section 206 provides for the appointment of arbitrators by a
court, pursuant to the parties’ agreement, but says nothing about such
appointment in the absence of agreement.193 Presumably, a court would
simply look to section 5 of Chapter 1 for such authority194 as a residual
supplement fully consistent with both Chapter 2 and the New York
Convention; however, this overlap between Chapters 1 and 2 gives rise to
potential inconsistencies in standards for setting aside or enforcing awards.
Chapter 1 provides standards for both confirmation of an award195 and
setting aside of an award.196 However, these standards are somewhat different
than those for enforcement contained in the New York Convention and those
for set-aside contained in most modern arbitration laws.197 As a result, the
standards for set-aside and enforcement may differ, depending on the
application of section 10 (and perhaps section 11) to awards governed by the

190

See supra text accompanying note 176.
9 U.S.C. § 205. Venue is also provided for in 9 U.S.C. § 204.
192
Id. § 208.
193
Id. § 206; John P. Bowman, The Panama Convention and Its Implementation Under
the Federal Arbitration Act, 11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 90 (2000) (noting that section 206
addresses appointment only pursuant to the parties’ agreement, thus necessitating resort to
section 5 in the absence of any agreement).
194
See 9 U.S.C. § 5 (2009).
195
A private arbitration award is made enforceable through court confirmation
proceedings.
196
An award vacated or set aside by a court with proper jurisdiction is rendered a nullity
for most purposes.
197
In contrast, Article 34 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration provides for set aside provisions that essentially mirror the bases for nonenforcement contained in Article V of the New York Convention. MORRISSEY & GRAVES
supra note 8, at 462. This was done intentionally in an effort to harmonize the limited bases
for non-enforcement, whether applied in the context of a set aside proceeding or an
enforcement proceeding. See Pieter Sander, The History of the New York Convention, in
IMPROVING THE EFFICIENCY OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND AWARDS 11, 13 (Albert Jan
Van Den Berg ed., 1999).
191
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New York Convention.198 The proper answer to this issue is anything but
clear.
Under Chapter 1, section 9, an award is subject to “confirmation” (i.e.,
can be made enforceable) unless subject to being vacated, modified, or
corrected under sections 10 or 11,199 thus seemingly applying the same
standards to both set-aside (or vacation) and enforcement (or confirmation)
under Chapter 1; however, Chapter 2, section 207, provides for “confirmation” unless an award would be subject to non-enforcement under the
New York Convention200 — again, a different set of standards than those
contained in Chapter 1, section 10.201 If courts interpreting Chapter 2 were
interested in harmonizing the standards for setting aside and enforcing
awards, they might reasonably read section 207 broadly and apply these same
bases for non-enforcement to actions to set aside an award governed by
Chapter 2. Alas, they generally do not,202 so a legal action addressing the
viability of an award may be governed by different standards, depending on
whether it is styled as a “confirmation” action or an action to “set aside” the
award. The difference may be particularly dramatic to the extent a party may
seek to have an award set aside based on the “manifest disregard”
standard.203
198

For a more thorough examination of the inherent issues arising from the overlap
between Chapters 1 and 2, see generally Jarred Pinkston, Toward a Uniform Interpretation
of the Federal Arbitration Act: The Role of 9 U.S.C. § 208 in the Arbitral Statutory Scheme,
22 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 639 (2008).
199
9 U.S.C. § 9.
200
Id. § 207.
201
Bowman, supra note 193, at 98, 107.
202
See, e.g., Jacada (Eur.), Ltd. v. Int’l Mktg. Strategies, Inc., 401 F.3d 701, 712 (6th Cir.
2005).
203
This standard is unique to U.S. law, albeit considerably less certain in application after
the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Hall Street. Associates v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S.
576, 584-85 (2008). Circuit courts have split on the question of whether the “manifest
disregard” basis for setting aside an arbitral award survived the Court’s decision in this case.
See Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. Animal Feeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 93-94 (2nd Cir. 2008),
rev’d on other grounds, 130 S.Ct. 1758 (2010) (holding that the doctrine has survived, but
noting the contrary view of the First Circuit, and then finding that the standard was not
satisfied in the instant case). In reversing the Second Circuit decision, the Supreme Court
analyzed the arbitration panel’s decision under section 10(a)(4) of the FAA, instead of the
manifest disregard standard. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S.Ct. at 1767-68. However, the Court
specifically declined to address the question of whether “manifest disregard” had survived
Hall Street, while simultaneously noting that this standard was also satisfied in the instant
case. Id. at 1768 fn 3. In any event, the Second Circuit continues to consider the doctrine a
viable one. See Matthew v. Papua New Guinea, No. 10-0074, 2010 WL 3784198, at *1-*2
(2d Cir. Sept. 30, 2010) (explaining when use of the “manifest disregard” standard would be
appropriate but ultimately finding that “that the Arbitrator did not manifestly disregard the
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This inconsistency in set-aside and enforcement standards arising from
the overlap between Chapters 1 and 2 is a perfect example of the problems
with piecemeal amendment of the FAA and the reasons why a comprehensive new statute governing domestic and international commercial
arbitration is necessary. In addition to the same inconsistencies presented by
Chapter 2,204 Chapter 3 also presents its own unique challenge based on its
overlap with Chapter 1.
b. Arbitration Under the Panama Convention and Its Incorporation
of a Fully Developed Set of Default Rules
Chapter 3 provides for the application of the Panama Convention to the
same categories of arbitration agreements governed by Chapter 2, but differs
in that it only applies when a majority of the parties to the arbitration
agreement are from signatories to the Panama Convention.205 The Panama
Convention has been ratified by a significant number of states within the
Americas (including the United States),206 and will generally govern
arbitration involving parties from two of these states or arbitration relating to
a transaction that contemplates performance or enforcement outside of the
law”).
In providing its reasoning for continued use of the “manifest disregard” standard, the
Second Circuit held in its original Stolt-Nielen decision that the doctrine was unaffected by
the Court’s limitation of review to FAA section 10, because it believed the “manifest
disregard” doctrine to be grounded in sections 10(a)(3) and 10(a)(4). Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d
at 94-95. Section 10(a)(3) has no direct corollary under the New York Convention, and,
while Article V1(c) of the Convention bears some similarities to FAA section 10(a)(4), it
would be difficult, if not impossible, to find any serious suggestion that Article V1(c)
included the sort of “manifest disregard” standard applied under the FAA.
204
Much of Chapter 2, including section 207, is incorporated into Chapter 3, and the
Inter-American Convention provisions on non-enforcement are identical to those contained
in the New York Convention. Thus, cases governed by Chapter 3 must address this same
inconsistency between standards for set aside and enforcement. See, e.g., Banco de Seguros
Del Estado v. Mut. Marine Offices, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 681, 684-85 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
Paramedics Electromedicina Comercial Ltda. v. GE Med. Sys. Info. Techs., Inc., No. 02 Civ.
9369, 2003 WL 23641529, at *5, *7 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2003).
205
9 U.S.C. § 305.
206
Argentina, Boliva, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Domincan Republic, Ecuador,
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, United States,
Uruguay, and Venezuela have all ratified the treaty. Multilateral Treaties: Inter-American
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration Signatories and Ratifications, ORG. OF
AM. STATES, DEP’T OF INT’L LAW, http://www.oas.org/juridico/ english/sigs/b-35.html (last
visited Mar. 27, 2011).
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United States.207 Thus, it has a potentially widespread application to arbitration agreements.208
The Panama Convention is, to some degree, less complete than the New
York Convention, thus potentially requiring greater supplementation via
Chapter 1—with one major exception: Article 3 of the Panama Convention
provides for the application of the Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American
Commercial Arbitration Commission (IACAC) in the absence of an express
agreement by the parties.209 “The practical effect of this provision is to
supply a great deal of arbitration ‘law’ through the Commission rules unless
the parties otherwise provide.”210 These rules are essentially identical to the
original UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.211
Currently, it may be worthwhile at this stage to recall the difference
between a national law governing arbitration and a set of rules contractually
agreed upon by the parties by incorporating these rules into their agreement.
The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration is a
modern law governing international commercial arbitration, while the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules represent a set of rules typically incorporated
by parties seeking ad hoc arbitration,212 and sometimes used as a model for
institutional arbitration rules.213 However, there is nothing precluding the use
207

In fact, based on the statutory language of 9 U.S.C. § 202 (incorporated into Chapter 3
by § 302), read in combination with § 305, an arbitration agreement in a contract between
two U.S. businesses, which contemplated performance or potential enforcement abroad—
even in a country not a signatory to the Panama Convention (e.g., in Germany, China, or
Australia)—would be subject to Chapter 3 and the Panama Convention. Although an
enforcement action governed by the Panama Convention makes little sense if enforcement is
likely in a country not a signatory, there is no fundamental reason why an arbitration
proceeding between two U.S. businesses contemplating performance in Germany could not
be governed by Chapter 3 of the FAA. The author is not aware of any court or commentator
who has addressed this issue, but it represents yet another anomaly arising from the
piecemeal drafting of the FAA.
208
For a more thorough examination than that provided herein, see generally Bowman,
supra note 193 (distinguishing the Panama Convention from the New York Convention).
209
Panama Convention, supra note 7, art. 3.
210
MACNEIL, ET. AL., supra note 101, § 44.8.2.
211
Bowman, supra note 193, at 29. The only meaningful difference is the designation of
IACAC as the appointing authority in the event that the parties are unable to agree on an
arbitrator. See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 50, at art. 6. Under the UNCITRAL Rules, an appointing authority is designated by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in
The Hague. Id.
212
This is arbitration under a specified set of rules, but without designating an institution
for purposes of administering the arbitration. See MORRISSEY & GRAVES, supra note 8, at 35.
213
See generally, Arbitration Rules of the Chicago International Dispute Resolution
Association, CHICAGO INT’L DISPUTE RESOLUTION ASS’N (July 1, 2005), http://cidra.org/
arbrules (providing a list of these rules).
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of a private set of rules, such as the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, as the
basis for a legislatively enacted set of default legal rules, as apparently
enacted in the case of FAA Chapter 3. In fact, private rules and legal rules
address many of the same issues214—especially those default rules characterized in Part II.A.2, above, as “arbitration procedure” issues, but also
sometimes including those characterized as “front end” issues.215 It is the
latter group of default legal rules governing “front end” issues that present
perhaps the most interesting conflict between Chapter 1 and Chapter 3.
The bulk of these “front end” issues arises when the parties are unable to
agree upon the appointment of an arbitrator. As explained above in Part
II.A.2, FAA Chapter 1 sends the parties to court for appointment of the
arbitrator.216 In contrast, the IACAC Rules provide for appointment of an
arbitrator by the IACAC, thereby avoiding any need to resort to court
proceedings.217 Thus, the default legal rule applicable under Chapter 3—by
virtue of the application of the Panama Convention and its incorporation of
the IACAC Rules—fundamentally differs from the default legal rule
applicable under Chapter 1 on the question of appointment of an arbitrator in
the absence of party agreement.218 This difference is fundamental because it
reflects a basic difference between United States law and modern arbitration
law with respect to court involvement in front end issues. United States law
reserves “front end” issues for the courts,219 while many modern national
laws and private rules grant considerable authority to the arbitrators or
private institutions to address many of these “front end” issues.
In particular, the vast majority of modern arbitration laws grant
arbitrators the authority to determine their own jurisdiction under the doctrine
214

The rules agreed upon by the parties, by way of incorporation, of course take
precedence over any default legal rules, just as any specific provisions of the arbitration
agreement, itself, take precedence over the incorporated rules.
215
“Back end” issues are rarely addressed in private “rules,” as these more typically
involve mandatory rather than default legal rules, such as the legal standards for set-aside
and enforcement. Inasmuch as the parties have no power to vary such legal rules, there is
little point in adding them to a set of private rules to be incorporated by the parties.
216
9 U.S.C. § 5 (2006).
217
See Bowman, supra note 193, at 32 (pointing out the positive practical effect of
reducing the need for judicial intervention and the costly delay often associated with such
proceedings).
218
The author is unaware of any court attempting to address this issue under Chapter 3.
However, other decisions applying Chapter 3 give considerable cause for skepticism. See
infra note 225.
219
See RUAA, supra note 28, pp. 9-31, 35-49 §§ 2-8, 10-14 (including reference to
involvement of courts in “front-end” issues in specified sections).
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of competence-competence.220 However, FAA Chapter 1 does not. As
explained in Part II.A.2, section 4 provides that the basic jurisdictional
question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate must be decided by the
court.221 While the United States Supreme Court has now seemingly clarified
that the parties may contractually grant the arbitral tribunal the power to
decide its own jurisdiction,222 such a contractual right is not equivalent to a
statutory grant of competence-competence.223 Thus, the incorporation of the
IACAC Rules via the recognition of the Panama Convention in Chapter 3 is
quite significant, because Article 21 of these rules provides for competencecompetence.224
By incorporating Article 21, FAA Chapter 3 has effectively provided for
statutory competence-competence, a provision quite typical in modern
arbitration law outside of the U.S., but quite unique in U.S. arbitration law.
Unfortunately, this “uniqueness” has apparently led at least one court to fail
miserably in its attempt to interpret and apply FAA Chapter 3 and its
incorporation of the IACAC Rules.225 In fairness, the problem faced by
220

See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 26, art. 16.
See supra Part II.A.2.
222
Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010); see First Options of
Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942-43 (1995).
223
The problem is largely one of circularity. Under a contractual approach to
competence-competence, any power to decide whether the parties agreed to arbitrate must
come from the agreement to arbitrate itself. In contrast, a statutory grant of competencecompetence is not dependent on the parties’ agreement, thus, to at least some degree,
avoiding this problem of circularity. The significant problems with contractual competencecompetence are more fully addressed infra Part II.D.
224
IACAC Rules, supra note 116, art. 21(1) and (2).
225
See Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Parra, 25 F. Supp. 2d 467, 475-76 (Del. 1998) (giving effect
to section 4 of Chapter 1 over the incorporation of Article 21 of the IACAC Rules under
Chapter 3). The court first determined, somewhat inexplicably, that case law under FAA
Chapter 1 was not “in conflict” with the Panama Convention. Id. at 475. Thus, the provisions
of Chapter 1 were not superseded by Chapter 3. It is hard to see how one could support such
an assertion, and the court does not. However, its analysis is also interesting for its
remarkable preference for case law over a clear and unambiguous statutory provision. The
court goes on to suggest that a statute should not be read to differ from a common law result,
absent a clear and unequivocal imperative required from the nature of the enactment. Id. at
476. Finding no express intent to change the common law (notwithstanding the express
intent in Chapter 3 to give effect to the Panama Convention), the court declines to give effect
to the clear and unequivocal language of Chapter 3, the Panama Convention, and the IACAC
Rules. Finally, the court seemingly characterizes FAA Chapter 1, section 4, as a mandatory
rule of law (citing Article 1(2) of the IACAC Rules, which states that such rules are subject
to mandatory rules of law), while simultaneously citing First Options, which clearly suggests
that section 4 is not a mandatory rule of law, but one that even parties can contract around.
Id. at 476; see also Bowman, supra note 193, at 140-49 (providing its own critical analysis
of the court’s decision).
221
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courts attempting to interpret and apply Chapters 2 and 3 of the FAA is one
of attempting to reconcile substantially different bodies of arbitration law on
a number of fundamental issues. Under such circumstances, perhaps it should
not be surprising that courts are often not up to the challenge.
Ultimately, the FAA provides solid footing for the enforcement of
arbitration agreements to the extent the parties provide the details of such
agreements. However, the FAA provides little more than bare skeletal
provisions beyond its basic pro-enforcement bias. Moreover, the integration
of the original act with the enabling legislation supporting the enforcement of
the relevant international conventions has added further challenges and
confusion to the growing common law body of United States arbitration
law.226
One suggested solution to the current confusion and inconsistencies
found in United States law governing international commercial arbitration is
a new “restatement” of this law.227 Normally, the idea of “restating” a statute
would seem to be logically inconsistent with the basic nature of a statute.228
In this case, however, the very idea of “restating” the United States law
governing international commercial arbitration demonstrates the inadequacy
of the current statutory scheme—as a statute. In effect, this obsolete,
inadequate, and often inconsistent statute has largely been displaced by
federal common law.229 Thus, it might be useful to ask the more basic
question of whether any arbitration—domestic or international—should be
governed by common law.
226

George A. Bermann, Restating the U.S. Law of International Commercial Arbitration,
42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 175, 176 (2009) (noting commercial arbitration is “an area of
the law needing clarification”).
227
Id. (arguing the publishing of the new Restatement in this area will clarify aspects of
U.S. arbitration law and judicial precedents).
228
The author is by no means questioning the need to do “something” to improve the
current state of the law in this area or the qualifications of the extraordinary group of
individuals assigned to perform the task, but simply the concept of “restating” law
purportedly governed by a statute. For example, it seems unlikely that anyone would ever
suggest a “restatement” of the law governing the sale of goods, because sales of goods are
governed in the United States by U.C.C. Article 2, unless displaced in certain cross-border
transactions by the CISG—each fully developed coherent statutes.
229
It is this odd mix of statutory metamorphosis in conjunction with international
conventions—now largely overtaken by federal common law—that gives rise to the need for
such a restatement. Notably, restating the law governing international commercial arbitration
is apparently proving to be an unexpectedly difficult task. See Bermann, supra note 226, at
175 (noting “already a number of difficult, and to some extent unexpectedly difficult,
questions have arisen” in the development of a restatement).
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B. Gap Filling Under Federal Law by Courts or Legislators: Is It Time To
Amend or Replace the FAA, or Should We Leave the Job to the Courts?
Many of the gaps in the FAA have been filled by court decisions,
including numerous decisions of the Supreme Court. In fact, these Supreme
Court decisions have seemingly left the actual language and intent of the
statute far behind.230 As a result, what we have today is arguably a body of
federal common law governing arbitration. Assuming one agrees with this
assertion, one might next reasonably ask whether this is a good thing.
Professor Rau acknowledges that arbitration in the United States is
governed today by federal common law,231 but suggests this common law
approach provides good reasons to leave the FAA alone rather than amend
it.232 Rau acknowledges some of the standard rationales one hears in
opposition to amending the FAA, including the notion that any attempt to
tinker in any way with the FAA will open the proverbial “Pandora’s box” of
various special interests and vexing issues.233 But Rau focuses primarily on
his asserted belief that courts are more likely than legislators to “get it right”
and provides numerous examples of what he believes to be particularly
grievous examples of proposed statutory solutions to various issues arising in
arbitration.234
This focus on poor drafting and flawed reasoning might miss the mark.
After all, it is likely that even Professor Rau would acknowledge the plethora
of badly reasoned and poorly drafted court decisions on arbitration—though
perhaps suggesting that a bad court decision is easier to fix than a bad statute.
Presumably, one can find excellent examples of both judicial and statutory
draftsmanship if one looks in the right places, and this is arguably the
aspirational standard. If so, then this might lead one to ask if there is some
basis other than institutional competence for determining whether arbitration

230

See Moses, supra note 92, at 99.
See Rau, supra note 46, at 202. In effect, Professor Rau suggests that, by definition, a
common law statute can never contain a “gap” inasmuch as such gaps are filled by decisional
common law. Id. Thus, apparently, the “bare-bones” FAA is fully fleshed out if we simply
know how to view it properly. Of course, it could also be said that any civil law statute, by
definition, contains no gaps, inasmuch as any apparent gaps are simply filled by looking to
the general principles underlying the statutory enactment. However, that misses the issue,
which is whether the actual express provisions of the FAA are sufficiently well developed to
provide useful guidance as a set of default legal rules governing arbitration.
232
Id. at 169.
233
Id. at 170.
234
Id. at 169-82.
231
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ought to be governed by a comprehensive statute or a comprehensive body of
common law cases.
On this point, Professor Rau explains his basic preference for the
common law, as an incremental and dynamic means of developing the law,235
and one could debate this question at length based on the relative advantages
and disadvantages of common law versus statutory legal regimes.236 However, it is important to remember that this is a very specific sort of contract—
an agreement to resolve disputes by arbitration—and not by court
adjudication. As such, it would seem that the parties’ intent ought to inform
the determination of an appropriate legal regime.
At a bare minimum, the parties to a binding arbitration agreement have
expressed their intent to resolve their dispute through final and binding
arbitration. Assuming that the arbitration agreement says nothing more, it
can, at the very least, be inferred that these same parties intended not to go to
court.237 Thus, the very idea of using appellate court cases to construct a body
of law to govern their relationship is antithetical to the notion of arbitration.
Certainly, there will always be parties who overreach in attempting to take a
dispute to arbitration when it belongs in the courts, and there will always be
recalcitrant parties who attempt to avoid arbitration—notwithstanding an
earlier agreement to use it for dispute settlement. Courts will also likely
remain necessary for certain forms of specific relief.238 However, these
occasions on which the parties must resort to the courts should be the exceptions, and they certainly should not be the lifeblood of the law governing
an agreement not to go to court.
Professor Rau correctly points out that arbitration is ultimately based on
the consent of the parties.239 As such, the parties’ consent to arbitration must,
235

See id. at 199, 202-03 (showing support for the common law as a principled and
accretional method for developing law).
236
One might even go further with this analysis by comparing common law and civil law
based legal systems.
237
A positive choice of final and binding arbitration is also a negative rejection of court
adjudication. Cf. Julian Lew, Does National Court Involvement Undermine the International
Arbitration Process? 24 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 489, 491 (2009) (saying that while parties to
an international transaction may have additional reasons to avoid national courts, the parties’
implied rejection of court adjudication by choosing private arbitration is equally clear in a
domestic transaction).
238
Stephen P. Bedell & Louis K. Ebling, Equitable Relief in Arbitration: A Survey of
American Caselaw, 20 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 39, 40, 79 (1988) (noting the impossibility for
arbitration to grant recission and reformation or to provide relief not explicitly contracted for
in the arbitration agreement).
239
Rau, supra note 46, at 204.
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at some point, be subject to judicial determination if disputed.240 However,
this determination need not be required as a threshold matter (or even
necessarily permitted as a full judicial determination) prior to the constitution
of the tribunal and completion of the full arbitral process—including a
jurisdictional determination by the arbitrators.241 Moreover, courts should be
a last resort, because when the parties go to court, many of the specific
benefits they sought in choosing arbitration in the first place are lost.
The parties’ preference for confidentiality is typically lost with the first
court proceeding, as their private dispute suddenly becomes public.242 The
parties’ preference for an expert decision maker is lost to the extent their
arbitration agreement may be subject not only to a court review, but to a jury
determination.243 Perhaps most significantly, the parties’ desire for a prompt,
efficient resolution of their dispute on the merits is completely lost in a
painfully long process of court determinations—potentially including an
appellate process to the highest level—before any decision maker ever has a
chance to hear the merits of the underlying dispute.244 Whatever one’s preference for the common law, it flies in the face of basic common sense to
240

Id. at 204-05. In fact, it is under the FAA that this obvious point has been called into
serious question. In First Options, the Supreme Court seemingly provided that the parties
could vest the arbitrators with the power to determine their own jurisdiction—just as they
can vest the arbitrators with the power to decide the merits of their dispute. See First Options
of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) (suggesting that an arbitrator’s decision on
jurisdiction, if mandated by the parties’ agreement, should be treated essentially the same on
review as a decision on the merits). However, such questions on the merits are not subject to
appellate review, so one might reasonably ask whether, under this Court-developed doctrine
of contractual competence-competence, a court would ever have the power to review the
basic question of whether the parties agreed to arbitration. The Court’s recent decision in
Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010), seems only to confirm and add
to these concerns and is discussed more fully infra Part II.E.
241
Under many arbitration regimes, the arbitrators not only have the authority to
determine their own jurisdiction, but, in many instances, a court is precluded from conducting any more than a prima facie inquiry prior to the arbitrators’ determination. See John
J. Barcelo, Who Decides the Arbitrators’ Jurisdiction? Separability and CompetenceCompetence in Transnational Perspective, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1115, 1124-30
(2003). Any subsequent review may be informed by the arbitrators’ analysis (even though it
is not binding in any way on a reviewing court), and the issue may never arise, depending on
the outcome of the arbitration proceedings on the merits (the party bringing a claim in
arbitration would, of course, have no basis to contest the arbitrators’ jurisdiction over the
claim).
242
Arbitration proceedings are private, and parties are often bound to strict
confidentiality requirements. In contrast, court proceedings are a matter of public record.
243
See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006). Whatever one’s views as to juries, the parties’ intent to refer
disputes to an expert decision maker would seem contrary.
244
This is the most significant complaint expressed by business users of arbitration today.
See supra Part I.
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require parties to sacrifice the most fundamental benefits of their bargains in
order to learn the content of those bargains. Yet, this is exactly what
transpires when parties must go to court—and to appellate courts—in order
to learn the default rules governing final and binding arbitration.
In the case of an agreement to final and binding arbitration, the parties’
expectations are best served by a complete and comprehensive statutory
scheme—not a piecemeal series of attempts to patch together an aging
statute—but a complete and comprehensive statute, drafted to reflect
normative commercial arbitration practices and the expectations of the
business community. If, however, one agrees with this proposition, this does
not end the inquiry, as legislation might be provided at either a state or
federal level.245 The potential for providing default legal rules governing
arbitration under state law is explored next.
C. What About State Law?
Arbitration may also—at least potentially—be governed by state law, and
virtually every state has enacted a statute of some sort governing
arbitration.246 The following states have general arbitration statutes that
follow the Uniform Arbitration Act of 1956 (UAA): Arkansas; Delaware;
Idaho; Illinois; Indiana; Iowa; Kansas; Kentucky; Maine; Maryland; Massachusetts; Missouri; Montana; Nebraska; South Carolina; South Dakota;
Tennessee; Virginia; and Wyoming.247 This Act addresses most of the same
issues addressed by the FAA, but also adds provisions addressing a few

245

For example, U.C.C. Article 2, discussed supra at Part I.C, is a model statute enacted
at the state level.
246
In fact, the Uniform Arbitration Act dates back to 1955, and, by the year 2000, fortynine states had arbitration acts. RUAA, supra note 28, at Prefatory Note (2000).
247
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-7-201 to 16-7-224 (2007); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 57015725 (2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 7-901 to 7-922 (2007); 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-5/23
(2007); IND. CODE §§ 34-57-2-1 to 34-57-2-22 (2007); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 679A.1679A.19 (West 2007); KAN. STAT. ANN §§ 5-401 to 5-422 (2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
417.045-417.240 (LexisNexis 2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 5927-5949 (2007);
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 3-201 to 3-234 (LexisNexis 2010); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 251, §§ 1-19 (LexisNexis 2007); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 435.350-435.470
(West 2007); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-5-111 to 27-5-324 (2007); NEB. Rev. STAT. ANN. §§
25-2601 to 25-2622 (LexisNexis 2007); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-48-10 to 15-48-240 (2007);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 21-25A-1 to 21-25A-38 (2007); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-5-301 to
29-5-320 (2007); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-577 to 8.01-581.16 (2007); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§
1-36-101 to 1-36-119 (2007).
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procedural issues ignored by the FAA, as well as an additional specific
ground for vacating an award where there was no agreement to arbitrate.248
The following states have not explicitly adopted the UAA, but their
arbitration statutes include provisions very similar to the UAA: Connecticut;
Florida; New Hampshire; Ohio; Pennsylvania; Texas; and Vermont.249 The
Mississippi Code looks particularly similar to the UAA; however, it does
seem to add more provisions than the UAA.250 For example, it adds a Notice
to Parties provision and the Code goes more into detail on the role of
arbitrators.251 Michigan has adopted many of the same provisions as the
UAA, but has taken a rather unique approach in getting there. The actual
statute includes a general provision on enforceability, a provision for court
appointment of an arbitrator, and provisions on court jurisdiction and venue,
but little else of obvious consequence.252 However, section 5021 directs the
reader to the rules of the Michigan Supreme Court,253 which include a
number of provisions on procedure, as well as confirmation, vacation, or
modification—much like those of the UAA.254 Of course, by including such
provisions in the court rules, the legislature has delegated the power to amend
these rules to the Michigan Supreme Court.255
248

See generally UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT §§ 1-25 (1956). More specifically, section
12(a)(5) provides for vacation of an award where the arbitrators themselves (and not the
court) determined the parties had agreed to arbitrate and did so over an objection by the party
seeking vacation, and the reviewing court determines that the parties did not agree to
arbitrate the dispute. Id. at § 12(a)(5). This provision would seem to avoid the challenges
presented by the Supreme Court’s dicta in First Options, suggesting a more deferential
standard of review under such circumstances. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514
U.S. 938, 943 (1995) (suggesting that an arbitrator’s decision on jurisdiction, if mandated by
the parties’ agreement, should be treated essentially the same on review as a decision on the
merits). However, one might ask if this “solution” to the First Options problem somehow
makes the statute less “pro-arbitration,” in which case it would likely be preempted by the
FAA.
249
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-408 to 52-424 (West 2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
682.01-682.22 (West 2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 542:1-542:11 (2007); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 2711.01-2711.16 (LexisNexis 2007); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 73017320 (West 2007); TEX CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE. ANN. §§ 171.001-171.098 (West 2007);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 5641-5681 (2007).
250
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 11-15-1 to 11-15-37 (2007).
251
Id. §§ 11-15-5, 11-15-7.
252
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.5001-600.5035 (West 2007).
253
See Id. § 600.5021 (stating that “[t]he arbitration shall be conducted in accordance
with the rules of the supreme court”).
254
See MICH. CT. R. 3.602. Rule 3.602 further cross-references the reader to the standard
rule of civil procedure for subpoenas. See id. at (F)(1).
255
See MICH. CT. R. 1.201. One could reasonably ask if this might be a more transparent
and predictable approach than that of the United States Supreme Court in periodically

268

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2:225

The following states have general arbitration statutes that follow the
Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA): Alaska; Arizona; Colorado;
Hawaii; Minnesota; Nevada; New Jersey; New Mexico; North Carolina;
North Dakota; Oklahoma; Oregon; Utah; and Washington.256 Even though
the following states have not explicitly adopted the Revised Uniform
Arbitration Act, their statutory provisions are extremely similar to those of
the RUAA: California; Georgia; and Rhode Island.257 Wisconsin has adopted
an extremely detailed arbitration statute and, more specifically, an explicit set
of default provisions.258
The Louisiana statute largely mirrors the FAA, while adding a few
provisions similar to those found in the UAA.259 Perhaps of more interest in
relation to the issues explored by this Article in Part I.D, the Louisiana statute
is extraordinarily unique in its placement. While found within Revised
Statutes, it has been placed in a section specifically addressing “Code
Ancillaries,” and within that section, among various forms of nominate
contracts. In effect, Louisiana law treats arbitration as a civil code based
nominate contract.260
The remaining states have arbitration statutes that are arguably even more
minimalist in nature than the FAA. The Alabama Code focuses primarily on
the arbitrators and a few procedural matters but does not even clearly state
that ex ante arbitration clauses are enforceable.261 West Virginia’s statute
defining or redefining the contours of the FAA.
256
RUAA, supra note 28; ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.43.300-09.43.595 (2007); COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 13-22-201 to 13-22-223 (2007); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 658A-1 to 658A-29 (West
2007); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 38.206-38.248 (LexisNexis 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
2A:23B-1 to 2A:23B-32 (West 2007); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-7A-1 to 44-7A-32 (West
2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-569.1 to 1-569.31 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-29.3-01 to
32.29.3-29 (2007); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 1851-1881 (2007); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
36.600-36.740 (West 2007); UTAH CODE. ANN. §§ 78B-11-101 to 78B-11-131 (LexisNexis
2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.04.101-7.04.220 (West 2007). Arizona and Minnesota
enacted these statutes in 2010. See H.R. 2430, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010),
available at http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/49leg/2r/bills/hb2430h.pdf; H.R. 1692, 86th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2010), available at https://www.revisor.mn.gov/ data/revisor/law/ 2010/
0/2010-264.pdf. The District of Columbia has also adopted RUAA. See D.C. CODE §§ 164401 to 16-4432 (2001).
257
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1280-1294.2 (West 2007); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-1 to 9-918 (2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 10-3-1 to 10-3-21 (2007).
258
WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 788.01-788.18 (West 2007).
259
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4201-9:4217 (2007).
260
As noted supra at note 86, the Québec Civil Code treats arbitration in a similar
manner.
261
ALA. CODE §§ 6-6-1 to 6-6-16 (2007).
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addresses even fewer issues than Alabama’s and clearly applies only to ex
post submissions of controversies.262 The New York statute addresses basic
questions of enforceability, motions to compel or stay proceedings, a few
procedural matters, and grounds for vacation of an award.263 However, the
statute is remarkably minimalist for a state where the most well-known
American arbitration institution makes its home,264 and many complex
commercial cases are undoubtedly arbitrated.
Notwithstanding the current menagerie of state laws described above, one
might reasonably suggest that—whatever the deficiencies in the FAA—the
gaps in federal law could be filled by uniform state law instead of federal
law. In fact, this was one of the primary objectives behind the relatively
recent revision and promulgation of the RUAA.265
1. The RUAA as an Attempt To Fill Gaps in the Federal Arbitration Act
and Provide Default Legal Rules Under State Law
The prefatory note to the RUAA points out that, while effective in
ensuring the enforceability of arbitration agreements, earlier state law had
failed to address many issues arising in modern arbitration agreements266—
much as the FAA has ensured enforceability of arbitration agreements but
failed to address many of the issues arising in modern arbitration agreements.
The RUAA was expressly intended to provide a “default mechanism if the
parties do not have a specific agreement on a particular issue.”267 While the
drafters realized that “front end” and “back end” issues might well be
preempted by the FAA, the RUAA was intended primarily to address default
legal rules governing “arbitration procedure,” which are virtually nonexistent within the FAA.268
Ten years after its completion, the RUAA has only been adopted by
fourteen states and the District of Columbia.269 It is, thus, questionable
262

W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-10-1 to 55-10-8 (West 2007). Arguably, one might reasonably suggest that this is not an arbitration statute at all, inasmuch as it does not even hint at
addressing ex ante arbitration agreements.
263
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7501-7514 (MCKINNEY 2007).
264
AAA Offices: Headquarters and Departments, AM. ARBITRATION ASSOC’N, http://
www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=29067 (“1633 Broadway, 10th Floor, New York, New York 10019”)
(last visited Mar. 27, 2011).
265
RUAA, supra note 28, at Prefatory Note.
266
Id.
267
Id.
268
Id.; see supra Part II.A.2 for a definitional explanation of “front end” issues, “back
end” issues, and “arbitration procedure.”
269
A Few Facts About the Uniform Arbitration Act (2000), NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
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whether it is realistic to assume that the RUAA could serve to provide any
“uniform” default legal rules governing even “arbitration procedure” any
time in the near future. The reasons for this somewhat lackluster performance
may be manifold, but the following two possibilities come to mind.
First, the actual provisions of the RUAA have been the subject of
significant criticism. Professor Rau frequently points to the drafting of the
RUAA in his efforts to suggest that legislators (even private legislators) are
less competent than courts to provide legal rules governing arbitration, and in
doing so points out particular specific problems with the statute.270 The
RUAA also attempts to address the broad array of existing arbitration
agreements, including consumer and employee arbitration but fails to remedy
many of the failures of the FAA in this respect.271 More importantly for the
focus of this Article on business-to-business arbitration, one of the advisors
to the drafting committee levels a more general criticism, suggesting that the
default procedural rules within the RUAA are more consistent with lawyers’
views of traditional litigation than with business attitudes regarding the
virtues of arbitration.272 To be sure, the RUAA also has its proponents and
believers.273 However, it has failed to achieve the sort of broad acceptance
normally associated with a “uniform” state law.
Second, the extent of FAA preemption is anything but certain. While the
drafters of the RUAA assumed that the FAA did not preempt state procedural
rules, as long as such rules were pro-arbitration, the extent of FAA
preemption remains to a large degree unresolved. The FAA unquestionably
has broad preemptive force in displacing state laws governing arbitration.274
While some continue to urge a significant role for state law, such as the
RUAA,275 and a more limited view of preemption, the issue remains subject
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, , available at http://www.nccusl.org/Update/ActSearch
Results.aspx (last visited on Mar. 27, 2011).
270
See Rau, supra note 46, at 170-79.
271
See Sarah Rudolph Cole, The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act: Is It the Wrong Cure?
4 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 10, 12 (2002).
272
See Hayford, supra note 44, at 437-39. Professor Hayford is specifically singled out as
one of the major contributors, as a member of the RUAA drafting committee. RUAA, supra
note 28, at Prefatory Note.
273
Roger Alford, Report to Law Revision Commission Regarding Recommendations for
Changes to California Arbitration Law, 4 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 1 (2003).
274
See Rau, supra note 46, at 192.
275
See generally Stephen L. Hayford & Alan R. Palmiter, Arbitration Federalism: A
State Role in Commercial Arbitration, 54 FLA. L. REV. 175 (2002); Jill I. Gross’, OverPreemption of State Vacatur Law: State Courts and the FAA, 3 J. AM. ARB. 1 (2004)
(suggesting a role for state law, even on “back end” issues).
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to significant questions.276 In the face of such uncertainty, the only effective
way to provide for default legal rules is through new federal law.277
2. Additional Challenges in Looking to State Law for Default Legal Rules
In addition to the challenges addressed above, there may be an even more
fundamental reason why state law cannot reasonably serve as the foundation
for a system of default legal rules governing arbitration. It is worth recalling
that default rules are most needed when the parties have drafted a relatively
minimalist agreement. Such a minimalist agreement may arise from the
parties’ ignorance regarding many of the more nuanced issues that may arise
in arbitration and may often be a product of the parties’ desire to avoid
focusing on dispute resolution when negotiating a business transaction.278
Under such circumstances, it seems unlikely that a party would include a
clause expressly choosing the arbitration law of a particular state.
A general choice-of-law provision will not typically determine the law
governing the parties’ arbitration agreement.279 Thus, the parties must, in
some manner, provide a specific choice of law with respect to their
arbitration agreement if such agreement is to be governed by state law rather
than the FAA.280 However, it seems unlikely that a typical business party
276

See Drahozal, FAA Preemption, supra note 5, at 411-15 (raising doubts about the
application of state law default rules in the face of broad FAA preemption).
277
See Timothy J. Heinsz, The 2000 Revision to the Uniform Act: A Harbinger? 3 PEPP.
DISP. RESOL. L.J. 435, 435-36 (2003) (suggesting that, because of the preemptive effect of
the FAA, new federal law is the only way to address fully its many inadequacies).
278
See supra Part I.A.
279
The arbitration agreement is separable (or severable) from and fully independent of
the parties’ broader transaction. As such, a general choice-of-law provision is typically
deemed to govern only that broader transaction and not the arbitration agreement.
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995); Bermann, supra note 5,
at 1018. But see Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Stanford Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989) (inexplicably
applying California law based on a general choice of law provision in the parties’ contract,
and never expressly overruled by subsequent precedent more in line with the general rule).
Notwithstanding the anomalous result in Volt, few, if any, would suggest that a court should
apply state law to an arbitration agreement based solely on a general choice-of-law provision
in the parties’ contract.
280
In the absence of any express choice, an arbitration agreement is almost universally
governed by the law of the place of arbitration—the lex arbitri. Bermann, supra note 5, at
1018-19. Thus, one might reasonably ask if the choice of a particular state as the place of
arbitration also amounts to a choice of that state’s arbitration law. See Jack Garvey & Totten
Heffelfinger, Towards Federalizing U.S. International Commercial Arbitration Law, 25
INT’L LAW 209, 216 (1991) (raising the same uncertain question almost twenty years ago).
However, as a matter of practice, courts give virtually no analysis to the issue and simply
apply the FAA. Id. at 1018-22. Presumably, the broad preemptive effect of the FAA gives
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would be aware of such a need. Moreover, an express choice of law
governing an arbitration agreement would seemingly suggest to one’s
contracting partner that disputes arising out of the contemplated transaction
may be likely. Finally, the very notion of choosing law to govern arbitration,
a largely private dispute resolution procedure, may be counter-intuitive to the
typical business person—no matter how important that choice may later
prove to be. As such, it seems that state arbitration law—even if otherwise
perfectly suitable—would rarely, if ever, apply to govern the parties’
arbitration agreement when they most need default legal rules.
Moreover, the decision of the United States Supreme Court, in Volt,281
highlights the uncertainty in choosing state law. Whether a question of the
effect of a choice-of-law provision or the effect of FAA preemption,282 the
parties’ attempt to invoke state law will often lead them back to federal court
for an answer to these questions. Thus, their intent to arbitrate their disputes
and stay away from the courthouse is once again undermined.
3. State Laws Governing International Arbitration
Thirteen states have adopted specific laws governing international
commercial arbitration, and eight of these states have, to varying degrees,
based these statutes on the UNCITRAL Model Law.283 These state law
formulations governing international commercial arbitration also suffer many
of the same challenges discussed above, including federal preemption and the
rise to a presumption that the FAA governs, as the lex arbitri, rather than any otherwise
applicable state law. See Drahozal, FAA Preemption, supra note 5, at 411-15 (expressing
doubt regarding the implied intent reflected in the choice of a place of arbitration as
sufficient to amount to a choice of state default rules). At the very least, the current state of
jurisprudence on choice of law governing arbitration gives rise to considerable uncertainty.
281
489 U.S. 468 (1989); see also discussion of case cited supra note 279.
282
See supra Part II.C.1.
283
RUAA, supra note 28, at Prefatory Note (indicating that twelve states have enacted
specialized provisions regarding international commercial arbitration, of which seven have
based these enactments largely upon the UNCITRAL Model Law; however, Florida’s 2010
enactment in the following list adds one more state to this list). The UNCITRAL Model Law
serves, to a large degree, as the basis for the statutes adopted by California, Connecticut,
Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, North Carolina, Oregon, and Texas. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§§1287.12-1297.337 (Deering 2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 50a-100 to 50a-139 (2010); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 684.0001-684.0048 (LexisNexis 2010); 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 30/1-5
to 30/25-30 (LexisNexis2010); LA. REV.STAT. §§ 9:4241-9:4276 (2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§
1-567.31 to 1-567.67 (2010); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 36.450-36.558 (2010); TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. §§ 172.001-172.175 (West 2010).
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necessity of some sort of specific choice of state arbitration law by the
parties—as well as all of the uncertainties present therein. However, the
adoptions of the Model Law raise some additional issues worth mentioning
briefly.
Unlike the RUAA, the UNCITRAL Model Law is a complete modern
law governing all aspects of arbitration, from commencement through final
award, including actions for set aside or enforcement.284 As such, its
complete adoption285 raises far more potential conflicts with the FAA than
the RUAA. In addition to the provisions on “arbitration procedure,”286 the
Model Law provisions on “back end” and “front end” issues differ
significantly from the FAA.
The UNCITRAL Model Law, like the New York Convention, includes
different bases for set aside or non-enforcement than those contained in FAA
section 10.287 Inasmuch as section 10 has been deemed to be a mandatory
legal rule rather than default provisions,288 the likelihood of preemption
seems far greater.289 At the front end of the arbitral process, the Model Law
provides for statutory competence-competence, in direct contrast to FAA
284

RUAA, supra note 28, at Prefatory Note.
Not all of the eight states utilizing the Model Law as the basis for their own legislation
adopted all of its provisions. However, Connecticut, Florida, Louisiana and Oregon
substantially adopted the Model Law in its entirety. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50a-100 to
50a-139; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 684.0001-684.0048; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4241-9:4276;
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36.450-36.558, and all eight of these states have adopted the Model
Law provisions on competence-competence (the jurisdiction of the tribunal to rule on its own
jurisdiction). CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §1287.161; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50a-116; FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 684.0001-684.0017; 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 30/15-5; LA. REV. STAT. §
9:4256; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.46; OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36.484; TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 172.001-172.082.
286
While different than those contained in RUAA, the Model Law procedural provisions
raise the same sort of preemption issues as RUAA.
287
While different from section 10 of the FAA, the Model Law and New York Convention contain essentially identical provisions for both. Model Law Article 36 is identical to
New York Convention Article V on enforcement issues, and Model Law Article 34 differs
only in terms of the applicable law on the final two bases for set aside. The latter two bases
address subject matter arbitrability (not to be confused with the broad misuse of the term by
the U.S. Supreme Court) and public policy, each applying the law of the place of
enforcement in actions to enforce and the place of arbitration in actions to set aside an award.
288
See Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, 552 U.S. 576 (2008) (precluding the parties from
agreeing to expanded judicial review by holding that such review was statutorily limited to
those grounds listed in section 10).
289
In fact, one might reasonably infer that the California, Illinois, and Texas legislatures
consciously omitted Articles 34 and 36 of the UNCITRAL Model Law addressing set aside
and enforcement based on their likely preemption by the FAA. North Carolina’s approach is
more curious, inasmuch as it appears to add its own grounds for set aside, different from
either the FAA or Model Law. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.46.
285

274

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2:225

section 4.290 Under section 4, a court must first decide any issue as to whether
the parties agreed to arbitration, whereas Model Law Article 16 grants the
arbitrators the power to make this determination.291 It is now clear that
section 4 is far less of a mandatory rule of law than section 10, as section 4
may yield to a “clear and unmistakable” contrary choice by the parties to
delegate jurisdictional decisions to the arbitrators.292 However, section 4 of
the FAA is much less likely to defer to state law, as the issue is unequivocally
one governed by “‘substantive federal arbitration law.’”293
Lastly, it is worth recalling the discussion in Part II.A.3.b regarding
Chapter 3 of the FAA and its incorporation of the IACAC Rules, which are
themselves based on the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. While the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules are, in many ways, quite similar to the
UNCITRAL Model Law, they are not in fact the same. Thus, an arbitration
agreement governed by Chapter 3 under the FAA, but perhaps subject to a
state adoption of the Model Law based on the parties’ express choice, would
likely present some particularly challenging preemption questions, along with
the previously discussed issues relating to conflicts between FAA Chapter 1
and Chapter 3.294
Thus, any state law attempting to remedy the deficiencies in the FAA
regarding international commercial arbitration is even more likely to raise
preemption issues and questions giving rise to uncertainty in the arbitral
process, thus presenting an even greater likelihood of judicial involvement.
The role of the FAA in United States arbitration is far too central to simply
work around it. For effective legal reform, the menagerie of the FAA and its
considerable body of federal common law must be replaced by a single, new,
comprehensive statute. However, one final question remains. Are default
legal rules truly needed, or can private rules adopted by the parties serve the
same purpose?

290

See UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 26, at art. 16.
Id.
292
See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943-44 (1995) (explaining that
the parties may ask the arbitrators to decide this issue just like any other issue they might
assign to the arbitrators).
293
Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2781 n.4 (2010). This issue is
more fully discussed in Part II.E below.
294
See supra Part II.A.3.b.
291
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D. Can Institutional and Other Private Rules Serve as a Substitute for
Default Legal Rules?
One might reasonably question whether there is any need for a set of
default legal rules to govern arbitration agreements in view of the broad and
easy availability of institutional and ad hoc rules295 from which parties may
choose.296 However, the parties may fail to choose any rules. As indicated
earlier, the only requirement for an effective arbitration agreement is a
written agreement to final and binding resolution of a defined set of
disputes.297 Admittedly, the concern expressed earlier about sending negative
signals to one’s contracting partner by negotiating over dispute resolution298
may not be as acute with respect to selecting a set of rules. There is obviously
a substantial difference between including fifteen pages of detailed
arbitration procedures and agreeing to arbitrate under a well-known set of
institutional rules, which happen themselves to be fifteen pages long.
However, there may remain other reasons why parties fail to include a set of
rules in their arbitration agreement.
The parties may be attempting to save money by omitting any
institutional reference. In fact, this is exactly why parties sometimes choose
ad hoc over institutional arbitration.299 However, parties and their attorneys
may or may not be aware of the existence of ad hoc rules, detached from the
use of a particular arbitral institution. Thus, a party seeking to avoid dispute
resolution in court, but hesitant to commit to the costs of institutional
arbitration and unaware of the existence of ad hoc rules, might very well
propose arbitration without designating any rules at all. Again, it is important
to remember that not all contracts that include arbitration clauses are drafted
by lawyers. Thus, it is quite likely there will always be a significant
minority300 of arbitration agreements that do not include any designation of
rules.
Moreover, there is nothing inconsistent with parallel sets of (1) default
legal rules and (2) private rules for autonomous incorporation into parties’
295

Ad hoc rules, such as the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, are typically used in the
absence of institutional administration of the arbitration proceedings.
296
See, e.g., Rau, supra note 46, at 180 (suggesting, in the context of international
commercial arbitration, that the vast majority of parties to arbitration agreements designate
either a set of institutional or ad hoc rules).
297
See supra Part I.A.
298
See supra Part I.A.
299
MORRISSEY & GRAVES, supra note 8, at 330.
300
For purposes of this Article, the author is willing to concede this is likely a minority,
though an empirical analysis might be interesting—assuming one could actually sample
small business agreements, as well as large.
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contracts. By way of comparative example, parties to a sale of goods can
easily designate INCOTERMS 2000301 (or some other set of trade terms) to
govern various issues involving shipping and passage of risk (much like
parties to an arbitration agreement can designate a set of institutional rules).
However, UCC Article 2 also provides a set of default provisions addressing
these same issues in the event the parties do not—precisely in order to avoid
later disputes over omitted terms.
Lastly, there are certain terms that simply do not work effectively based
on autonomous choice, whether based on the parties’ own terms or their
incorporation of a set of arbitration rules, because of inherent flaws involving
circularity. The most classic example of this problem involves the doctrine of
competence-competence, or the power of an arbitral tribunal to determine its
own jurisdiction.
E. The Problem with Contractual Competence-Competence
FAA section 4 provides that a court must decide any question of whether
the parties agreed to arbitration of the dispute in question.302 In contrast, most
modern arbitration laws grant the arbitral tribunal the power to make this
determination itself, deciding its own jurisdiction—though solely as an initial
matter, and fully subject to later (or concurrent)303 court review within a
limited statutory framework.304 However, one might reasonably ask whether,
301

See Incoterms 2010, supra note 67.
9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006).
303
See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 26, at art. 8 (providing for the
possibility of concurrent jurisdictional determinations by the arbitral tribunal and a proper
court).
304
See, e.g., id. at art. 16 (granting the arbitrators the authority to determine their own
jurisdiction); id. at art. 34, 36 (providing for court review in an action to set aside or enforce
any award—but only on certain enumerated grounds, one of which is that the parties did not
agree to arbitration of the dispute in question). While the doctrine of competencecompetence operates differently in different legal systems as to “timing” (as to determinations by courts or arbitrators), the doctrine has gained near universal acceptance in
international practice, in no small measure due to the influence of the UNCITRAL Model
Law. Barcelo, supra note 241, at 1116-17. While this doctrine allows arbitrators to determine
their own jurisdiction (either concurrently or prior to a court determination), a court will
always have the final word on the issue—typically on a de novo basis. Id. at 1123. Even
French law, which is perhaps the most extreme in granting arbitrators the “first” decision
regarding jurisdiction. Id. at 1124-27; Richard W. Hulbert, Institutional Rules and Arbitral
Jurisdiction: When Party Intent is Not “Clear and Unmistakable,” 17 AM. REV. INT’L ARB.
545, 565-66 (2009) (providing for subsequent judicial review on the question of whether the
parties formed a valid arbitration agreement).
302
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under the FAA, the parties to an arbitration agreement could not accomplish
a similar result, in effect contractually granting the arbitrators the power to
decide their own jurisdiction. The United States Supreme Court appeared to
answer, in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan,305 that parties could do
exactly that.306 The parties could ask the arbitrators to decide the
jurisdictional question307 in the same manner they could ask the arbitrators to
decide any other question, such as the merits of their dispute.308 While
seemingly a straightforward exercise of party autonomy to refer a dispute to
arbitration, this decision raised a host of questions.309 If the basis of the
arbitral tribunal’s power to decide its own jurisdiction is no different than its
power to decide the merits of the parties’ dispute, as the Court suggested,310
then the tribunal’s decision on jurisdiction is subject to review only under the
standards of FAA section 10, which does not include any reference to the
lack of an agreement to arbitrate.311 As such, the arbitral tribunal would not
only have the power to decide its own jurisdiction, but would have the
exclusive, and largely non-reviewable, power to do so.312 At the very least,
305

514 U.S. 938 (1995).
See id. at 943. This answer was by no means self-evident, as section 4 might also
reasonably be read as providing for “mandatory” determination by a competent court on the
question of whether the parties have validly agreed to arbitrate their dispute. See generally
Horton, supra note 128.
307
The Supreme Court refers to this issue as one of “arbitrability.” See First Options of
Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 942. However, this Article will use the terms “jurisdiction”
or “competence,” in recognition of their more universal use in arbitration practice, globally.
Whereas the Supreme Court deems a dispute not “arbitrable” if the parties did not agree to
arbitration, the more universal practice is to say that an arbitration tribunal lacks
“jurisdiction” or is not “competent” to decide a dispute if the parties have not so agreed. The
problem with using this “arbitrability” term with respect to the question of whether the
parties agreed to arbitration is that it also has many other meanings that are quite different
and more precise, and its use regarding the agreement to arbitrate can lead to unnecessary
confusion. See MORRISSEY & GRAVES, supra note 8, at 409-10.
308
First Options, 514 U.S. at 942.
309
See, e.g., William W. Park, The Arbitrability Dicta in First Options v. Kaplan: What
Sort of Kompetenz-Kompetenz Has Crossed the Atlantic? 12 ARB. INT’L 137 (1996); Alan
Scott Rau, The Arbitrability Question Itself, 10 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 287 (1999).
310
See First Options, 514 U.S. at 943.
311
9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006). The only possible provision a court might invoke in attempting
to review a tribunal’s jurisdictional decision is section 10(4)—however, any use of this
section for such a purpose is potentially problematic on a much larger scale, as more fully
explained below. See, e.g., Hulbert, supra note 304, at 546-47 (pointing out the potential that
the First Options dicta might be read as providing not only for the power of the arbitrator to
decide the jurisdictional question, but also making such decision immune from judicial
review).
312
It was not at all clear that the Court intended such a result, but the Court’s language
certainly suggested this possibility.
306
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the Court had seemingly provided for contractually agreed upon competencecompetence,313 so long as the parties’ intent was “clear and unmistakable.”314
The Court’s opinion in First Options undoubtedly led to a number of new
drafting ideas with respect to arbitration agreements, two of which are
particularly relevant for our analysis here.
First, a number of United States arbitral institutions have included
provisions within their domestic rules giving the arbitral tribunal the power to
determine its own jurisdiction.315 Of course, one might seriously question
whether an arbitration agreement including a set of rules, within which the
arbitral tribunal was granted the power to decide its own jurisdiction, could
possibly amount to “clear and unmistakable” intent to consign this issue to
the arbitrators.316 However, a substantial majority of federal courts dealing
with the issue have had little difficulty finding such consent in exactly this
manner.317 In effect, a contractual version of competence-competence is
arguably becoming the norm within the United States, notwithstanding its
omission in the FAA. However, it is worth noting the obvious at this stage.
The arbitrators’ authority to decide their own jurisdiction is based solely on
whether the parties agreed to arbitration in the first instance. Thus, any grant
of such authority is arguably fundamentally flawed, as a matter of contractual
consent, based on its inherent circularity. Perhaps even more importantly, the
arbitrators’ decision may be virtually unreviewable under FAA section 10,
313

If granted by the parties, the arbitral tribunal would have the power to determine its
own jurisdiction—i.e., it would possess the competence to determine its own competence.
314
First Options, 514 U.S. at 944.
315
See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND
MEDIATION PROCEDURES 7-8 r.7 (2010) (providing for determination by the arbitral tribunal
of “the existence or validity of a contract of which an arbitration clause forms a part”);
JAMS, supra note 61, at 14 r.11(c) (providing for determination by the arbitral tribunal of
“[j]urisdictional and arbitrability disputes, including disputes over the formation, existence,
validity, interpretation or scope of the agreement under which Arbitration is sought”). The
AAA Rule providing for competence-competence was first added to its domestic rules in
1999, just four years after the First Options decision. See Hulbert, supra note 304, at 563.
316
If agreeing to a term incorporated in a large body of rules amounts to “clear and
unmistakable” consent, one might reasonably ask what sort of consent does not satisfy this
purportedly heightened standard for proving consent.
317
See, e.g., Contec Corp. v. Remote Solution Co., 398 F.3d 205, 208-09 (2d Cir. 2005);
Terminix Int’l Co. v. Palmar Ranch Ltd. P’ship, 432 F.3d 1327, 1332-33 (11th Cir. 2005)
(finding “clear and unmistakable” evidence based on the parties’ agreement to arbitration
under the AAA Rules, including Rule 7); Mark Berger, Arbitration and Arbitrability:
Toward an Expectation Model, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 753, 790 (2004); Joseph L. Franco,
Comment, Casually Finding the Clear and Unmistakable: A Re-Evaluation of First Options
in Light of Recent Lower Court Decisions, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 443, 467-70 (2007).
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unless perhaps the parties also contracted for heightened judicial review. This
is where the second new idea came into play. In order to alleviate any
concerns a court might have that an arbitrator’s decision might be
unreviewable, parties inserted contractual provisions for subsequent judicial
review.318
In Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson,319 the problems with contractual
competence-competence were squarely presented. The Rent-A-Center
contract executed by its employee, Jackson, included a provision in the
arbitration agreement itself, clearly and unmistakably assigning to the arbitral
tribunal the authority to decide any and all questions related to its
jurisdiction, including the question of whether the parties had concluded a
binding arbitration agreement—and assigning this decisional authority on an
“exclusive” initial basis, though still subject to later judicial review.320 Not
surprisingly, Rent-A-Center relied on First Options in arguing that this
provision was fully enforceable and the initial jurisdictional question was
solely and exclusively for the arbitrators to decide.321 In effect, Rent-ACenter took the Court at its word in First Options and drafted an arbitration
agreement seeking to take full advantage of the Court’s dicta.
Jackson asserted an unconscionability defense to the purported arbitration
agreement322 and, more importantly for the issue before the Court, wanted
this issue decided by a court under FAA section 4, and not by an arbitrator.323
Jackson pointed out the obvious flaws in First Options applied to these
318

At least this was the thinking before the Supreme Court decided Hall Street Associates
v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
319
130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010).
320
See Brief for the Petitioner at 4-5 Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010)
(No. 09-497), 2010 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 315; Joint Appendix at 29-30 exhibit 1 Rent-ACenter v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010) (No. 09-497), 2010 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 153.
Under the parties’ agreement, this “exclusivity” was purely temporal. The arbitral tribunal
would have the exclusive opportunity to decide the issue—as an initial matter. However, this
decision was later to be subject to plenary court review under the parties’ agreement. Id. As
more fully explained below, the effect of the Court’s decision in Hall Street likely renders
this provision for plenary review ineffective.
321
Brief for the Petitioner at 11-14 Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010)
(No. 09-497), 2010 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 315.
322
Brief for Respondent at 3-4 Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010) (No.
09-497), 2010 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 260. Jackson asserted that the arbitration agreement,
specifically, is unconscionable—not the container contract—thereby attempting to avoid the
doctrine of separability. Id. at 7-8. While an unconscionability defense directed at the
arbitration agreement itself is far more likely to arise in the context of consumer or employee
arbitration, other invalidity defenses, such as duress, mutual mistake, or fraud, could
certainly arise in a commercial context.
323
Id. at 10-11.
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circumstances. The arbitrators’ authority to determine jurisdiction could not
logically rely on the very agreement that Jackson was contesting as unconscionable.324 This would amount to a classic example of circularity.325
Moreover, surely such circular reasoning could not serve as the basis for
granting the arbitrators the “exclusive” authority to make this determination.
As presented, this case seemed to require the Court to either: (1) follow
the First Options dicta to its logical conclusion, enforcing the parties’
contractual delegation of competence-competence to the arbitrators or (2)
explain that the court did not really mean precisely what it said in First
Options. Interestingly, Jackson suggested a way the Court might limit the
dicta in First Options, arguing that the Court merely stated that the parties
could grant the arbitral tribunal the authority to determine the “scope” of their
arbitration agreement, provided the parties actually had an enforceable
arbitration agreement in the first instance.326 However, Jackson argued, the
latter issue was necessarily one for the courts—no matter what the parties’
agreement said.327 In a 5-4 decision, the Court took the first course and did
so, in large part, by relying on the doctrine of separability.328 The case nicely
illustrates the fundamental problem of circularity associated with contractual
competence-competence.
Separability and competence-competence represent distinct, but related,
doctrines.329 Competence-competence provides the arbitrators with the power
to decide threshold jurisdictional issues, while separability ensures the
viability of the tribunal’s decision on the substantive dispute assigned to it—
assuming it determines that it has jurisdiction to decide the substantive
dispute in question.
For all of its continuing controversy,330 the Supreme Court’s original
decision to embrace separability in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
324

Id. at 10.
In effect, one cannot lift oneself off the floor by pulling on one’s own bootstraps—no
matter how hard one pulls. Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2779, 2781 (2010);
Brief for Respondent at 24, 40 Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010) (No. 09497), 2010 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 260.
326
Brief for Respondent at 39-40 Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010) (No.
09-497), 2010 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 260.
327
Id. at 23-31.
328
See generally Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2788 (2010) (finding that
“whether the arbitration agreement is unconscionable is itself severable from the merits of
the underlying dispute, which involves a claim of employment discrimination”) (emphasis in
original).
329
Barcelo, supra note 241, at 1116.
330
See Rent-A-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2785 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (continuing, over forty
325
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Manufacturing331 was arguably an unremarkable, and entirely necessary,
extension by implication of section 2 of the FAA.332 Section 2 makes
enforceable an agreement to resolve a contractual dispute by arbitration, and
parties subject to contractual claims will often raise traditional contract
validity defenses such as duress, mistake, fraud, or unconscionability. The
defenses are often raised as a matter of course, and they are also frequently
intertwined with the merits of the dispute referred to arbitration. Thus, if the
arbitral tribunal could not effectively decide these questions, the entire
arbitral process would almost certainly be subject to lengthy delays, and the
agreement to arbitrate would often be rendered ineffective.333
Two simple examples illustrate the importance of the doctrine of
separability to an effective arbitration regime. In each case, A brings an
action against B for breach of a contract that includes an arbitration
agreement. B raises a defense of mutual mistake, asserting that the contract is
therefore voidable.334 Under the doctrine of separability, the arbitral tribunal
is empowered to decide this defense, without any effect on the arbitration
clause contained within the potentially voidable main contract. Without
separability, in example one, a court might decide this defense. However, this
would essentially resolve this particular case, and the parties would be
deprived of their contractual agreement to arbitrate the dispute. Still without
separability, in example two, an arbitrator might go ahead and try to decide
the parties’ dispute. However, the arbitrator could only issue an enforceable,
preclusive decision in one direction—that of denying B’s defense. If the
arbitrator decided in favor of the defense, he or she would also necessarily
have to acknowledge the lack of any remaining jurisdiction to do anything
but send the parties away without resolving their dispute. Separability, of
course, resolves this very important practical problem—albeit with an
admitted bit of theoretical “sleight of hand”—by allowing the arbitrator to
decide the parties’ dispute, including any invalidity defense involving the
main contract and to do so in favor of either party in an enforceable, preclusive award.335
years later, to describe the Court’s decision in Prima Paint as “‘fantastic’” and “likely erroneous”); see also Richard C. Reuben, First Options, Consent to Arbitration, and the Demise
of Separability: Restoring Access to Justice for Contracts with Arbitration Provisions, 56
SMU L. REV. 819, 841-48 (2003) (providing a substantial critique of the separability
doctrine).
331
388 U.S. 395 (1967).
332
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
333
See MORRISSEY & GRAVES, supra note 8, at 368-71.
334
For the sake of clarity and simplicity, this is the only issue in this set of hypotheticals.
335
See MORRISSEY & GRAVES, supra note 8, at 368-71.
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In Rent-A-Center, the parties’ arguments largely centered over the
interpretation of the First Options dicta: was “delegation” largely limited to
scope (or, perhaps, other similar issues) or did “delegation” include the
question of whether the parties had agreed to arbitrate anything at all? The
dissent suggests that the majority announced a rule not advocated by either
party,336 and at least one commentator seems to agree.337 However, the
majority’s decision in Rent-A-Center is arguably nothing more than an
inevitable result of a literal reading of First Options taken to its logical
conclusion, including the necessary application of the doctrine of separability.
In First Options, the Court stated that the parties could delegate questions
regarding jurisdiction (or, in the Court’s vernacular, “arbitrability”) to the
arbitrator, including the questions of whether the parties had agreed to
arbitration at all or whether the dispute in question fell within the scope of
that agreement.338 In doing so, the Court explained that the parties’
agreement to delegate these jurisdictional decisions to the arbitrator was the
equivalent of an agreement to delegate decisions regarding their dispute on
the merits, and was subject to the same standard of review as a decision on
the merits—that contained in section 10 of the FAA.339
Taken at face value, the dicta from First Options said, quite clearly, that
the parties could delegate jurisdictional decisions to the arbitrator, whose
decision on the issue would be equally final to that of a decision on the
merits—as long as this delegation is “clear and unmistakable.”340 Thus,
unless the Court was prepared to ignore or, in some way, “refine” its earlier
First Options dicta, its decision in Rent-A-Center was virtually a foregone
conclusion; the question of whether Jackson’s agreement to arbitrate might
be unconscionable and, therefore, invalid had been “clearly and
unmistakably” delegated to the arbitrator.
What apparently surprised some,341 including the dissenters,342 was the
majority’s application of the doctrine of separability under these circumstances. However, if the parties’ delegation of the question of jurisdiction
336

See Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. at 2782 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See Cross, supra note 15.
338
First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942-45 (1995); see also Barcelo,
supra note 241, at 1133 (explaining the rebuttable presumption against the former and
contrasting it with the presumption in favor of the arbitrator’s power to determine the latter).
339
First Options, 514 U.S. at 943 (1995).
340
Id. at 944.
341
See, e.g., Cross, supra note 15.
342
See Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2781-82 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
337
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to the arbitrator is no different from their “delegation” of their dispute on the
merits, then the majority’s approach seems quite logical. The “delegation
provision” is separable from the arbitration agreement in exactly the same
manner that the arbitration agreement is separable from the main contract, of
which it often forms a part.343 Moreover, this application of the doctrine of
separability is fully consistent with its purpose, as explained above. Absent
the doctrine of separability, the arbitrator would be empowered only to make
a positive decision on jurisdiction pursuant to the “delegation” clause,
because a negative decision would deprive the arbitral tribunal of its
jurisdiction on the “delegation” question, thereby negating the preclusive
effect of any decision.
The problem with the Court’s decision in Rent-A-Center does not lie in its
application of separability in that case. Instead, the problem arises from the
First Options dicta and the entire notion of contractual competence-competence, which the majority in Rent-A-Center simply applied as written.
As mentioned earlier, the arbitration agreement at issue in Rent-A-Center
included a provision for expanded judicial review of any decision of the
arbitrators.344 However, this provision is almost certainly ineffective today
based on the Court’s decision in Hall Street, strictly limiting judicial review
to the very narrow grounds provided in FAA section 10.345 Thus, if Rent-ACenter and Hall Street are read together, as written, they clarify that the
arbitrator’s decision on jurisdiction will be final, subject only to review under
section 10, which does not include any review of whether the parties
concluded a valid arbitration agreement.346 The arbitrator’s decision is,
essentially, unreviewable—at any stage—under the Court’s interpretation of
contractual competence-competence.347
343

Id. at 2777-79.
Id. at 2781.
345
See Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
346
Of course, there would be no reason to provide for such review if section 4 provided
for mandatory jurisdictional decisions by a court in the first instance. See Horton, supra note
128, at 4-6 (explaining the inherent inconsistency in the Court’s treatment of section 10 as
mandatory and exclusive, while treating section 4 as a default rule subject to the parties’
contrary agreement).
347
Admittedly, it is possible that “manifest disregard” has, in some form, survived Hall
Street. See Nicholas R. Weiskopf & Matthew S. Mulqueen, Hall Street, Judicial Review of
Arbitral Awards, and Federal Preemption, 29 REV. LITIG. 361, 367-71 (2010) (providing,
perhaps, some basis for review of a particularly egregious jurisdictional decision). It is also
possible that a court might resort to section 10(4), providing for review and setting aside of
an award in which the arbitrators “exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them
….” However, the use of this provision, like the “manifest disregard” standard is fraught
with the potential to undermine the finality of awards on the merits of an arbitral dispute,
because the Court has said that “delegation” of the jurisdictional question is governed by
344
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Taken at face value, this result seems bizarre, though such a perspective
is admittedly affected by one’s own subjective lens. However, the result is
objectively and quite clearly inconsistent with the standards for enforcement
of international arbitration awards under the New York Convention. The
Convention provides for recognition of arbitration agreements, unless a court
finds “said agreement is null and void,”348 and provides for enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards, subject to an exception where a court finds the
parties’ “[arbitration] agreement is not valid.”349 As explained in Part
II.A.3.a, the New York Convention applies to a variety of non-domestic
agreements and awards and is also the legal instrument through which awards
rendered in the U.S. are typically enforced abroad.350 This inconsistency
between FAA section 10 and the New York Convention creates a very real
possibility that an award that is not subject to “vacation” under section 10
might nonetheless be unenforceable under the New York Convention. Such
inconsistencies can easily be avoided by simply ensuring the statutory
grounds for vacation of an award mirror those for non-enforcement, and also
reflect those for judicial recognition of an arbitration agreement351—an
approach taken in the vast majority of modern arbitration statutes, but largely
ignored in the implementation of the New York and Panama conventions
under the FAA.
The purpose of an arbitration agreement is to avoid court proceedings in
resolving any dispute arising from the parties’ commercial relationship. An
arbitrator’s decision on such issues is necessarily protected from subsequent
scrutiny in order to give effect to the parties’ bargain for an efficient and final
resolution of their dispute—without going to court. However, these same
principles are misplaced when the issue is whether the parties ever agreed in
the first instance to arbitrate anything. In this latter case, a court must—at
some point—have an opportunity to determine whether the parties in fact
gave up their right to judicial process. The statutory doctrine of competencecompetence provides for efficiency in allowing an arbitrator to make this
determination, while also ensuring the availability of meaningful judicial
review at some point in the process. The same cannot be accomplished
exactly the same legal principles as an agreement to arbitrate the merits of the parties’
contract dispute.
348
New York Convention, supra note 6, at art. II(3).
349
Id., art. V(1)(a). These same issues would arise with enforcement of an award under
the Panama Convention.
350
See supra Part II.A.3.a.
351
See supra note 198.
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through the Supreme Court’s efforts to create a contractual form of
competence-competence—at least not as currently articulated.352
Any attempt to address competence-competence through arbitral rules is
subject to the same deficiencies as an express agreement by the parties. Even
if sufficient to constitute “clear and unmistakable” consent, the effect of such
consent amounts to a final and absolute delegation of the issue, without
meaningful judicial review. Nor can state law effectively provide for competence-competence, inasmuch as the issue is unequivocally one governed by
“‘substantive federal arbitration law.’”353
The doctrine of competence-competence is central to modern commercial
arbitration and is arguably an absolute necessity for any modern statute. It
cannot be effectively invoked by contract. Instead, an effective competencecompetence regime must be a part of the statutory background,354 invoked
not by the terms of the parties’ disputed arbitration agreement, but by the
very existence of such a dispute brought to the attention of the arbitral
tribunal. It must also be subject to meaningful judicial review, whatever the
timing of such review. Many important arbitral doctrines can be invoked by
either private rules or by the law governing the arbitration. However, competence-competence must come from the underlying legal regime. Neither
party autonomy, nor private rules, nor state arbitration law can reasonably
serve as a substitute.

352

To the author’s knowledge, there is only a single historical example of such a purely
contractual doctrine of competence-competence, which was also arguably absolute and
unreviewable. This was the old view of “Kompetenz-Kompetenz” that developed for a
period under German law, but has since been abandoned in favor of the more modern
statutory approach. Gerold Zeiler & Katarina Hruskovicova, The Principle of Kompetenz
Kompetenz According to the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration, in The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration: 25
Years 109, 109 (Assoc. for Int’l Arb., eds., 2010).
353
Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S.Ct. 2772, 2781 n.4 (2010).
354
See Barcelo, supra note 241, at 1136 (suggesting statutory reform of U.S. law as the
most reasonable method for developing a robust and effective competence-competence
doctrine in this country). While Professor Barcelo also notes that even statutory competencecompetence involves a degree of “bootstrapping” or circularity, id. at 1132, this particular
exercise in circularity is at least fully subject to later judicial review.
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CONCLUSION
The time has come to jettison the aged and arcane U.S. Federal
Arbitration Act. It has fully served its original purpose of making arbitration
agreements enforceable355 and now serves only as a giant “black hole” into
which the courts pour more and more decisions and into which parties to
arbitration agreements—agreements expressly intended to avoid courts—
pour more and more of their money. The only fully functional way to provide
an effective set of default rules for arbitration agreements is to do so with a
new, comprehensive, modern arbitration statute, and the most efficient way
to do this is with a single statute governing all commercial arbitration—
whether domestic or international—that fully comports with modern global
standards.356 This is not to suggest that Congress should simply adopt, in
total, any particular model or national law, but simply that the time has come
to draft a modern statute to govern arbitration in the United States, and we
can learn much from those who have already considered and adopted such
statutes.
In commenting on a series of conference presentations, Professor
Carbonneau recently observed that the presentations on international
commercial arbitration were generally less controversial and more cogent
than those on domestic arbitration, which had focused on disparate party
arbitration—the most controversial aspect of U.S. arbitration law.357 He
further noted that “arbitration in the transborder context has thus far escaped
being mauled by the claws of politicalization [and] is vital to global
commerce ….”358 If we can somehow separate commercial, business-tobusiness arbitration—both domestic and international—from the political
morass of disparate party arbitration,359 then we should be able to find
355

In fact, some might even say it has served this purpose too well.
For two examples of such a statute, one could look to the German Arbitration Act of
1998 (an almost complete adoption of the provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law), or the
English Arbitration Act of 1996 (a unique comprehensive statute). See sources cited supra
note 20.
357
Carbonneau, supra note 15, at 417-18.
358
Id.
359
See Stipanowich, supra note 15, at 57 (pointing out the significant contextual
differences involved in legislation governing business-to-business arbitration, as compared to
consumer and employee arbitration). The U.S. should follow the basic European approach
and separately regulate consumer and individual employment arbitration, limiting each to ex
post agreements to arbitrate. However, the purposes of this Article could be served by any
means of separating the law governing commercial, business-to-business arbitration from
that governing consumer and individual employee arbitration.
356
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common ground in developing and adopting a modern federal arbitration
statute to govern this dispute resolution mechanism so vital to U.S.
commerce—both at home and abroad.

